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Recent instances of law enforcement killing community members and ensuing
social movements have increased public attention on the issue of police use of force
and the lack of officer accountability. Qualified immunity has been central to this
discussion because the doctrine is often used to shield officers from civil lawsuits when
plaintiffs bring constitutional tort claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The traditional understanding of qualified immunity as applied to excessive force
cases is that it tracks the history of the doctrine itself. It is widely accepted that the
doctrine began to thwart excessive force claims against police right after it emerged for
the first time in 1967 with Pierson v. Ray—a false arrest case that created a subjective
good faith defense for some § 1983 claims. Most assume this influence continued as
qualified immunity took on its modern form in 1982 with Harlow v. Fitzgerald—an
executive privileges case that created an objective qualified immunity test relative to
clearly established law. With this standard narrative, it is largely thought that these
early cases on qualified immunity in the contexts of false arrests and executive branch
privileges naturally, immediately, and seamlessly became a significant constraint on
plaintiffs’ § 1983 excessive force claims against police officers.
This is not what happened. Drawing upon an original empirical dataset of over
five hundred § 1983 excessive force cases over more than five decades, this Article is
the first to tell the story of how qualified immunity became an exculpatory doctrine of
police excessive force. The data shows a pattern where, over time, qualified immunity
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morphed from a limited theory of executive privilege into a specific theory
disproportionately used to prevent civil lawsuits against police officers who use
excessive force. We found that during its origins, qualified immunity was raised in a
variety of cases involving public officials, including disputes concerning employment
discrimination, free speech rights, and improper seizures of property. But as the power
of qualified immunity grew, so too did the proportion of qualified immunity cases
involving police officers facing § 1983 suits for using excessive force.
This data matches our doctrinal assessment. From 1967, when the Court first
created qualified immunity for § 1983 claims, until 2001, when the Supreme Court
issued its first decision in a qualified immunity case involving police excessive force
in Saucier v. Katz, many lower federal courts and legal scholars thought qualified
immunity did not apply in situations where police faced civil suits for using unlawful
amounts of force. Indeed, before 2001, the question of whether qualified immunity
ought to apply to police officers’ use of excessive force was deeply contested.
The empirical and doctrinal assessments provided in this Article suggest that there
is a “middle history” of qualified immunity that needs further exploration, i.e., a series
of federal court decisions that made qualified immunity a dominant § 1983 defense
for law enforcement. The middle history that brought qualified immunity into
excessive force doctrine has thus far been overlooked, which impoverishes our
understanding of how qualified immunity adversely impacts constitutional tort
litigation regarding police use of excessive force. This Article provides the first
identification and critical examination of this middle history to highlight the
particular doctrinal choices that federal courts made during these years to understand
how qualified immunity became enmeshed with § 1983 excessive force litigation.
These results demonstrate that while qualified immunity is now a central fixture in
almost all excessive force cases, it is only quite recently that this relationship took its
current shape as a largely insurmountable barrier to police accountability. The
doctrinal and empirical examinations provided by this Article help us understand the
political nature of qualified immunity and provide needed context for assessing
various police reform efforts.
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INTRODUCTION
Unarmed petty theft and burglary can be survival strategies for poor and
unhoused persons.1 Living on the streets of Nashville, Tennessee, Alexander
Baxter rummaged through unlocked houses so that he could steal items that
could be easily resold, such as video games and laptop computers.2 When the
police pursued him in response to a reported burglary, Baxter fled to the
basement of a nearby dwelling.3 Officers Harris and Bracey followed him with
their trained dog, who found Baxter downstairs.4 The two officers entered the

1 Survival crime is described as “offending out of necessity in order to survive the situation of
being homeless.” Rachel Pain & Peter Francis, Living With Crime: Spaces of Risk for Homeless Young
People, 2 CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHIES 95, 105 (2004); see also Chase Karacostas, Life Beyond ‘Survival
Crimes’, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (July 22, 2019, 6:31 PM), https://www.statesman.com/story/
news/local/2019/07/22/survival-crimes-can-trap-some-in-lgbtq-community-in-spiral-ofdesperation/4634164007 [https://perma.cc/8J3J-HGMU].
2 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Baxter v. Bracey, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020) (No.
18-1287) [hereinafter Petition for Cert.].
3 Id. at 4-5.
4 Id. at 5.
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basement where Baxter was hiding, commanding him to show his hands.5
Baxter testified in the district court that he did not verbally respond, but that
he “was sitting on his butt with his hands up in the air.”6 The police could
have easily arrested Baxter. But they chose a different tactic: releasing the
police dog, who bit Baxter’s armpit.7 Baxter required emergency medical
attention and was rushed to a local hospital.8
Baxter filed a federal civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C § 1983 that
sought monetary damages.9 He claimed that Officer Harris’ decision to
release the police dog after he surrendered with his hands up and Officer
Bracey’s failure to intervene violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from excessive use of force.10 Officers Bracey and Harris responded as most
police officers do when faced with a § 1983 claim: they said the doctrine of
qualified immunity shielded them from such civil lawsuits.11
Qualified immunity is a common law doctrine that states that government
officials can only face § 1983 civil lawsuits and the possibility of paying damages
if the plaintiff demonstrates (1) that a constitutional right was violated and (2)
that the unlawfulness of the conduct in question was clearly established at the
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. A Marshall Project investigation reveals the extent and severity of the use of police dogs as
weapons. Abbie Vansickle, Challen Stephens, Ryan Martin, Dana Brozost-Kelleher & Andrew Fan,
When Police Violence Is a Dog Bite, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 2, 2020), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2020/10/02/when-police-violence-is-a-dog-bite [https://perma.cc/5QPPF7ZW]. The investigation reported that “[d]og bites cause more hospital visits than any other use of
force by police,” with roughly 3,600 people per year treated in emergency rooms for police dog attacks.
Id. (citing Randall T. Loder & Cory Meixner, The Demographics of Dog Bites Due to K-9 (Legal
Intervention) in the United States, 65 J. FORENSIC & LEGAL MED. 9, 10 (2019); see also R. PAUL
MCCAULEY, WILLIAM F. BARKER, JAMES BOATMAN, VINEET GOEL, THOMAS H. SHORT & FENG
ZHOU, THE POLICE CANINE BITE: FORCE, INJURY, AND LIABILITY (2008), https://www.iup.edu/
criminology/files/research/reports_law_enforcements/k9-crc-report-11-08-final-for-pds_1_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6V82-CAVH]. A disproportionate number of victims of police dog attacks are
Black, and two separate investigations have shown that police use dogs “almost exclusively” to attack
non-White people. See Vansickle et al., supra (citing investigations into the Los Angeles County
Sherriff ’s Department and the Ferguson, Missouri Police Department). Many people attacked by
dogs are unarmed and suspected of non-violent crimes, such as minor traffic offenses. MCCAULEY
ET AL., supra at 3-4. Vansicle et al. note that qualified immunity is major barrier to holding police
accountable and providing compensation for victims attacked by police dogs. Vansickle et al., supra.
Police brutality involving police dogs was also recently highlighted by former President Trump’s
decision in the last days of his presidency to pardon a former Maryland police officer who was
convicted of ordering her police dog to attack an unarmed homeless man. Kristine Phillips, Trump
Pardons Former Officer Convicted in Police Brutality, Dog Bite Case, USA TODAY (Dec. 31, 2020, 10:20
AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/12/23/stephanie-mohr-officer-police-brutalitycase-gets-trump-pardon/3904405001 [https://perma.cc/TF7X-6D32].
9 Baxter v. Bracey, 751 F. App’x 869, 870 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020).
10 Petition for Cert., supra note 2, at 5.
11 Baxter, 751 F. App’x at 870.
5
6
7
8
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time.12 The United States Supreme Court has held that clearly established
means that “at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear
that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is
unlawful.”13 Put differently, “existing law must have placed the constitutionality
of the officer’s conduct beyond debate.”14 The Supreme Court famously
described qualified immunity in 1986 as “provid[ing] ample protection to all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”15
Officer Bracey moved to dismiss the failure-to-intervene charges.16 The
district court denied qualified immunity—a decision later affirmed by the
court of appeals.17 Citing the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Campbell v. City of
Springboro, the appeals court noted:
The right to be free from the excessive use of force in the context of police
canine units was clearly established by 2012, when in Campbell we held that
officers who used an inadequately trained canine, without warning, to
apprehend two suspects who were not fleeing, acted contrary to clearly
established law.18

Following discovery, both officers sought summary judgement by
asserting qualified immunity.19 Although previously denied, a different Sixth
Circuit panel concluded that qualified immunity did indeed apply.20 How
could this be? Didn’t Campbell provide clearly established Sixth Circuit law
on the matter? Not in the eyes of this panel.
In Campbell, the police released their dog on an individual who was lying
down.21 In this case, the officer released the police dog upon Baxter while he

12 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018). The Supreme Court has noted
that “‘clearly established law’ should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality’” but instead “must
be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017). A case does not
have to be “directly on point for a right to be clearly established,” but “existing precedent must have
placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148,
1152 (2018) (per curiam). In the context of Fourth Amendment excessive force cases, the Court has
said that “an officer ‘cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s
contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have
understood that he was violating it.’” Id. at 1153 (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79
(2014)). It is important to note that qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability . . . .” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis omitted).
13 Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
15 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (emphasis added).
16 Baxter v. Harris, No. 15-6412, 2016 WL 11517046, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2016).
17 Id. at *1.
18 Id. at *2.
19 Petition for Cert., supra note 2, at 7.
20 Id.
21 Campbell v. City of Springboro, 700 F.3d 779, 785 (6th Cir. 2012).
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was sitting up with his hands in the air.22 The Sixth Circuit panel concluded that
“Baxter does not point us to any case law suggesting that raising his hands, on
its own, is enough to put Harris on notice that a canine apprehension was
unlawful in these circumstances.”23 This rather petty detail—whether nonfleeing plaintiffs were lying down or sitting with hands up—motivated much
of the Sixth Circuit’s decision to find the officers immune from facing a civil
lawsuit.24 In their eyes, Campbell only clearly established that using a police dog
in those particular circumstances—poorly trained dog, plaintiffs lying down, no
verbal warning—was unlawful and not in other situations such as Baxter’s.
Qualified immunity, as a legal doctrine, has relied upon thin distinctions
that allow officers to evade accountability for excessive abuses, including
killing people.25 The idea that an officer post-Campbell would not know that
it was unlawful to release a police dog on a person visibly surrendering with
their hands up defies common sense and leaves police to brutalize people
without remedy or compensation.
Petition for Cert., supra note 2, at 5.
Baxter v. Bracey, 751 F. App’x 869, 872 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020).
The court also states that “even with Baxter’s hands raised, Harris faced a suspect hiding in an
unfamiliar location after fleeing from the police who posed an unknown safety risk—all factors the
Campbell court identified as significant to determining whether the seizure was lawful.” Id.
However, this level of specificity—whether plaintiff is lying down or on his rear end, arms raised or
not, etc.—runs contrary to the clearly established rule found in Campbell that focuses on broader
commonalities. The Campbell court stated that “[t]he question before this Court is whether or not
Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment protections against excessive force, as it relates to police dogs, was
clearly established at the time the incidents occurred.” Campbell, 700 F.3d at 788. In concluding that
the officers violated a clearly established right, the court focused on the fact that the officer “allowed
a ‘bite and hold’ dog, whose training was questionable, to attack two suspects who were not actively
fleeing and who, because of proximity, showed no ability to evade police custody.” Id. at 789. Given
this background, the Baxter court’s decision to hinge the qualified immunity decision on the absence
of caselaw on whether surrendering with hands up in light of the presence of caselaw on the
unlawfulness on using a police dog on a detained non-fleeing person is deeply problematic. The
commonalities between the two cases significantly outweigh any thin differences, which suggests
that it had been clearly established that the officers’ actions in Baxter were unlawful.
24 “A prior decision in the 6th Circuit had held that officers violated the Fourth Amendment when
they released a police dog on a suspect who had surrendered by lying down. But the appeals court ruled
that this precedent did not ‘clearly establish’ that it was unconstitutional to release a police dog on a
surrendering suspect with his arms raised.” Joanna Schwartz, Suing Police for Abuse is Nearly Impossible. The
Supreme Court Can Fix That., WASH. POST (June 3, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
outlook/2020/06/03/police-abuse-misconduct-supreme-court-immunity [https://perma.cc/WMG5-F4B].
25 See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 9-10, 19 (2015) (per curiam) (granting qualified
immunity to police who shot and killed a fleeing driver); Reich v. City of Elizabethtown, 945 F.3d
968, 973-74, 981-82 (6th Cir. 2019) (granting qualified immunity to police who shot and a killed
mentally ill individual during welfare check); Mason-Funk v. City of Neenah, 895 F.3d 504, 505 (7th
Cir. 2018) (granting qualified immunity to police who shot and killed a hostage attempting to escape
hostage situation); Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff ’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 942-44, 953 (9th Cir. 2017)
(granting qualified immunity to police who shot and killed an individual in a case involving “mental
illness, drug abuse, and domestic conflict”); Villegas v. City of Anaheim, 823 F.3d 1252, 1255-57 (9th
Cir. 2016) (granting qualified immunity to police who shot and killed a suspected armed drug dealer).
22
23
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Attention to the relationship between qualified immunity and police
impunity has grown in the wake of recent social movements against police
violence that gained momentum and public visibility following the
unjustified police killings of Tamir Rice, Breonna Taylor, George Floyd, and
many others. Protesters, commentators, and scholars have identified qualified
immunity as a barrier to accountability that allows police to use force
unlawfully without consequences and limits the ability of victims to use civil
rights statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to seek damages.26 State and federal
legislators have responded with proposals to reform or entirely eliminate
qualified immunity.27 And at the end of the Supreme Court’s 2020 term, the
Court had nine qualified immunity cases in conference—including Baxter v.
Bracey—leading many to think that it would take the opportunity to review,
rethink, or possibly overturn qualified immunity.28 Ultimately the Court
decided not to grant certiorari to any of these cases.29
26 See, e.g., Hailey Fuchs, Qualified Immunity Protection Emerges as Flash Point Amid Protests, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/us/politics/qualified-immunity.html (Oct. 18, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/X9G6-JVM6] (“[Because of qualified immunity,][i]n the vast majority of cases of
police brutality, officers are never criminally prosecuted); Andrew Chung, Lawrence Hurley, Jackie
Botts, Andrea Januta & Guillermo Gomez, Shielded, REUTERS (May 8, 2020, 12:00 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-scotus
[https://perma.cc/X77L-VZY6] (detailing a case in which the prosecution of police for killing
hospital patient Johnny Leija faced large obstacles due to qualified immunity); Devon W. Carbado,
Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1519-24 (2016)
(arguing that qualified immunity contributes to police violence). Justice Sotomayor has also
expressed concern that qualified immunity contributes to police violence. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at
26 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (“By sanctioning a ‘shoot first, think later’
approach to policing, the Court renders the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow.”); Kisela
v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (arguing that the
Supreme Court’s decision to reverse a circuit court denial of qualified immunity to an officer who
shot a woman who was holding a knife “tells officers that they can shoot first and think later, and it
tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished”).
27 See, e.g., S.B. 20-217, 72d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020), https://leg.colorado.gov/
sites/default/files/2020a_217_signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/46P7-UH37] (eliminating qualified immunity
for police officers facing liability under Colorado state law); Ending Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 7085,
116th Cong. (2020); Ending Qualified Immunity Act, S. 4142 116th Cong. (2020).
28 See, e.g., Jay Schweikert, Supreme Court Will Soon Decide Whether to Reconsider Qualified
Immunity, CATO INST. (April 28, 2020, 4:26 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/supreme-court-willsoon-decide-whether-reconsider-qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/B957-6HG8] (“[T]he Justices
are looking closely at the fundamental question of whether qualified immunity itself needs to be
reconsidered”); John Elwood, Relist Watch: Looking for the Living Among the Dead, SCOTUSBLOG (May
27, 2020, 11:29 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/05/relist-watch-looking-for-the-living-amongthe-dead [https://perma.cc/4T4B-CX4X] (discussing nine qualified immunity cases that the Court
relisted for conference).
29 Brennan v. Dawson, 752 F. App’x 276 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 108 (2020);
Brennan v. Dawson, 752 F. App’x 276 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Dawson v. Brennan, 141
S. Ct. 108 (2020); Baxter v. Bracey, 751 F. App’x 869, 870 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1862
(2020); Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 934 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 110
(2020); Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct 110 (2020); Corbitt v.
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It is largely assumed that the development of qualified immunity for
excessive force cases tracks the history of qualified immunity doctrine itself.
In the traditional story, the Supreme Court first created qualified immunity
in the 1967 case Pierson v. Ray, then modified the doctrine in the 1982 case
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, giving us its modern version. It is widely thought that
qualified immunity began to significantly limit civil lawsuits against police in
use of force cases since the doctrine’s inception.30
But this is not the case. Although qualified immunity has, in contemporary
times, played a pivotal role in nearly every excessive force lawsuit, it was not
until 2001 in the case Saucier v. Katz that the Supreme Court explicitly stated
that qualified immunity could apply to excessive force claims.31
Before 2001, the question of whether qualified immunity should apply to
police officers who use excessive force was deeply contested. From 1967, when
the Supreme Court first created qualified immunity for § 1983 claims, until
2001, when the Supreme Court issued its first decision in a qualified
immunity case involving excessive force, many lower federal courts and legal
scholars thought qualified immunity did not apply in situations where law
enforcement was accused of using unlawful amounts of force.32
Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 110 (2020); Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d
444 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Hunter v. Cole, 141 S. Ct. 111 (2020); West v. City of
Caldwell, 931 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. West v. Winfield, 141 S. Ct. 111 (2020);
Mason v. Faul, 929 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 116 (2020).
30 See Joanna Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797,
1802, 1814-15 (2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity] (describing the
history of qualified immunity as first announced in 1967 under a good faith standard, then modified
to an objective test in Harlow, and then modified again in Pearson); Joanna Schwartz, Police
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 889, 892-93 (2014) [hereinafter Schwartz, Police
Indemnification] (describing Harlow as the case that extended qualified immunity to police); William
Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 81 (2018) [hereinafter Baude, Is
Qualified Immunity Unlawful?] (starting a discussion of history with Pierson and then discussing the
court “tinkering” with the doctrine through Harlow, Saucier, and Pearson); Michael T. Kirkpatrick
& Joshua Matz, Avoiding Permanent Limbo: Qualified Immunity and the Elaboration of Constitutional
Rights from Saucier to Camreta (and Beyond), 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 643, 644 (2011) [hereinafter
Kirkpatrick & Matz, Avoiding Permanent Limbo] (discussing history of qualified immunity “from
Harlow to Pearson, pivoting around the Court’s creation of a mandatory scheme in Saucier and
subsequent retreat in Pearson”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer
Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 480 (2001) (describing qualified immunity as “transsubstantive” in the sense that it “applies equally to suits to enforce the First Amendment, the Fourth
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and every other justiciable provision of the
Constitution”). We discuss this point in further detail in infra Part III.
31 533 U.S. 194, 200-02, 204-07 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223
(2008). As discussed in this article, Pearson merely overruled Saucier’s sequencing requirement for
the qualified immunity inquiry and not the fact that qualified immunity applies in excessive force
cases. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
32 See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Problematic Standards of Reasonableness: Qualified Immunity in Section
1983 Actions for a Police Officer’s Use of Excessive Force, 62 TEMPLE L. REV. 61, 67 (1989) (“[E]ven
though qualified immunity is appropriately available as a defense for other [F]ourth [A]mendment
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This “middle history” of qualified immunity—the years after Harlow in
1982 through the Saucier decision in 2001—that brought qualified immunity
into excessive force doctrine is often overlooked. It is critical to examine the
particular doctrinal choices the Court made related to police and qualified
immunity during these years in order to understand how it became
entrenched in § 1983 excessive force litigation today. This Article highlights
this middle history to reveal how qualified immunity made its way into § 1983
excessive force litigation, quietly taking life out of constitutional tort actions
against police officers that abuse their authority.
This Article draws upon an original empirical dataset to tell the story of
how qualified immunity became an exculpatory doctrine of excessive force.
The data shows a pattern where, over time, qualified immunity morphed from
a narrow theory of executive privilege into a specific theory to limit civil
lawsuits against police officers who use excessive force. Our study sampled
and analyzed 569 district court cases to determine how the development of
qualified immunity at the Supreme Court impacted excessive force litigation.
claims, it is an unnecessary defense to a [F]ourth [A]mendment claim challenging the use of
excessive force because the standard for liability is identical to the standard for qualified immunity;
both question whether a reasonable officer would have believed that the use of force was necessary.
Because the standards overlap, qualified immunity is an unnecessary defense.”); David Rudovsky,
The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of
Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 59 (1989) (“A strong argument can be made that the use
of more force than is necessary preempts an immunity defense. Given the situation a police officer
faced, the question is whether the force used was justified and necessary; was it reasonable under
the circumstances? This is not an area of the law that involves a ‘thicket’ of legal opinions. While
each case may present different facts, this well-established legal standard remains the same. . . . A
finding of unreasonable use of force establishes the constitutional claim and defeats immunity.”);
LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2000) (reaffirming that the proper test
for qualified immunity in excessive force cases is the same as the test on the merits); Rowland v.
Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The immunity test and the test on the merits both rely on
an objective appraisal of the reasonableness of the force employed.”); Jackson v. Hoylman, 933 F.2d
401, 402-03 (6th Cir. 1991) (affirming the district court’s determination that “qualified immunity
turns on the same objective reasonableness standard that the claim of excessive force turns on . . . .”);
McNair v. Coffey, 234 F.3d 352, 355 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[O]nce a jury has determined under the Fourth
Amendment that the officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable, that conclusion necessarily
resolves for immunity purposes whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his conduct
was lawful.” (quoting Frazell v. Flanagan, 102 F.3d 877, 886-87 (7th Cir. 1996))); Frazell v. Flanagan,
102 F.3d 877, 886 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[A] number of circuits have indicated that a jury’s finding on the
Fourth Amendment question effectively resolves the immunity issue as well, because both questions
turn on whether the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.”); Guffey
v. Wyatt, 18 F.3d 869, 873 (10th Cir. 1994) (“If a plaintiff alleges a police officer has used excessive
force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the qualified immunity inquiry becomes
indistinguishable from the merits of the underlying action.”); Street v. Parham, 929 F.2d 537, 540
(10th Cir. 1991) (“When the jury . . . decided that the force used by the officer was unreasonable
under all the circumstances . . . [n]o officer could reasonably believe that the use of unreasonable
force did not violate clearly established law.”); Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 759 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (“[T]he issues of whether an officer used excessive force and whether an officer is entitled
to qualified immunity are both determined according to a single standard.”).
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We found that during its origins, qualified immunity was raised in a variety
of cases involving public officials, including cases about employment
discrimination, free speech rights, and improper seizures of property. But as
the power of qualified immunity grew, so too did the proportion of qualified
immunity cases involving police officers facing § 1983 suits for excessive force.
This Article’s legal and empirical examination of qualified immunity’s
evolution reveals its political nature and provides context for understanding
contemporary calls to eliminate the doctrine.
Qualified immunity defenses arise in response to constitutional tort
claims against police use of excessive force made through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Part I anchors the conversation concerning qualifying immunity in the
history of constitutional tort litigation stemming from § 1983, a federal civil
rights statute enacted after the Civil War to allow formerly enslaved people
to bring civil causes of action against government officials who violated their
constitutional rights. Enacted in 1871 yet dormant for several decades, it is
against this backdrop that qualified immunity first emerged in 1967. This Part
examines the historical ebbs and flows of § 1983 litigation as context for
understanding the emergence and power of qualified immunity as a shield to
excessive force claims. Part II discusses the traditional story about the
invention of qualified immunity by the US Supreme Court through three
foundational cases. It began in 1967 when Pierson v. Ray offered limited
immunity to § 1983 claims, was transformed into a broader rule based on a
two-part objective reasonableness test in 1982 in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, and
finally took on its most current and familiar form in 2009 when Pearson v.
Callahan overturned Saucier v. Katz, thereby eliminating any rules about the
sequence with which courts had to carry out the two-part qualified immunity
test. From this account, it was assumed that immediately after qualified
immunity randomly emerged in 1967 with Pierson and took on its modern
form in 1982 with Harlow that the doctrine had an adverse impact on how
federal courts read excessive force claims. Part III summarizes the existing
literature on qualified immunity to situate this Article’s doctrinal and
empirical contributions. Part IV discusses the research questions and methods
guiding our empirical study of the development of qualified immunity as a
defense for excessive force claims in district court cases. Part V reports our
empirical findings. Our data shows that for most of the history of modern
qualified immunity, it was relatively rare to have a qualified immunity case
that involved police use of force. Indeed, it was only after contested litigation
in the early 2000s over whether qualified immunity should apply to excessive
force claims at all that the doctrine became so closely connected to police use
of force. Part VI discusses how our empirical findings point to a critical
“middle history” of qualified immunity, from 1982 to 2001, when the Court
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had to decide whether it would apply qualified immunity to the Fourth
Amendment framework for excessive force claims that it developed in
Graham v. Connor. The Article concludes with an evaluation of current efforts
to eliminate qualified immunity for police officers and argues that although
these reforms have limits, they should be pursued as part of a broader strategy
toward ending police violence.
I. SECTION 1983 AS CONTEXT FOR UNDERSTANDING QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
How did a doctrine that lacks any basis in statutory or constitutional text
become deeply entrenched in § 1983 litigation? This Part describes how
qualified immunity initially became a part of constitutional torts by
explaining its origins in relation to § 1983. We begin with the birth of § 1983
when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871 following the Civil War.
We then discuss the reemergence of § 1983 in the 1960s after a long period of
dormancy, starting with the Supreme Court case Monroe v. Pape.
A. Reconstruction and the Civil Rights Act of 1871
Section 1983 was passed in the context of Reconstruction after the Civil
War.33 During this time, the Reconstruction Amendments—which consist of
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments—were ratified and
added to the U.S. Constitution.34 These amendments altered the relationship
between states and the federal government by making the federal
Constitution the legal source for rights that state or local government could
not violate.35 The Thirteenth Amendment formally abolished slavery; the
Fourteenth Amendment provided “equal protection of the laws” and
substantive rights that allowed freed Black people to live as equal citizens;
and the Fifteenth Amendment gave Black Americans the right to vote.36
Together, these new amendments were meant to bring an end to white
supremacy and intergenerational subordination of Black Americans.37
33 See generally Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years
Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 981, 983 (2002) (noting that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments were produced during the Reconstruction Era).
34 See id.; U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
35 See ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 107 (1998) (“The Reconstruction
amendments transformed the Constitution from a document primarily concerned with federal-state
relations and the rights of property to a vehicle through which members of vulnerable minorities could
stake a claim to substantive freedom and seek protection against misconduct by all levels of government.”).
36 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
37 See EDWARD E. BAPTIST, THE HALF HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 408 (2014) (“[The Fourteenth Amendment] wrote into the
Constitution a nationwide standard of birthright citizenship that would eventually enable future
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But even after the Reconstruction Amendments went into effect, new
forms of racialized oppression and institutional racism emerged. Racialized
violence ran rampant through the late 1860s and 1870s.38 Slave patrols
morphed into different entities such as local militias and the Ku Klux Klan,
and even gave rise to early police departments in some regions.39 During this
time, white supremacy was enforced through violence that was often carried
out or at least enabled by complicit state actors, including law enforcement.40
White state officials often protected and worked alongside white mobs that
terrorized Black communities.41
This is the context in which the Civil Rights Act of 1871 arose.42 Also
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, it allows individual plaintiffs to sue
generations—descendants of slaves and immigrants alike—to undermine racial and cultural
supremacy.”); FONER, supra note 35, at 105 (1998) (“[The Fourteenth Amendment’s broad language]
opened the door for future Congresses and the federal courts to breathe meaning into the guarantee
of legal equality, a process that has occupied the courts for much of the twentieth century.”).
38 See Bryan Stevenson, A Presumption of Guilt: The Legacy of America’s History of Racial Injustice,
in POLICING THE BLACK MAN 8 (Angela J. Davis, ed., 2017) (“In place of slavery, belief in a racial
hierarchy took virulent expression in newly defined social norms, including lynching and other forms
of racial terrorism; segregation and Jim Crow; and unprecedented mass incarceration.”); W.E.B.
DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 674 (1935) (“A lawlessness which, in 1865–1868,
was still spasmodic and episodic, now became organized, and its real underlying industrial causes
obscured by political excuses and race hatred. Using a technique of mass and midnight murder, the
South began widely organized aggression upon the Negroes.”).
39 See Katheryn Russell-Brown, Making Implicit Bias Explicit, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN,
supra note 38, at 140 (“Following the Civil War, slave patrols remained in force, only in a different
form. At the beginning of Reconstruction, various groups joined what had been the slave patrols
and were now the patrols designed to police the movements of newly freed slaves. The state militia,
the federal military, and the Ku Klux Klan became the new, more violent slave patrols.”); SALLY E.
HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE CAROLINAS 202 (2003)
(“After the Civil War, the violent methods of slave patrols would also be adopted and renewed by
groups dedicated to white supremacy at all costs, even by illegal means. . . . White Southerners
visited retribution upon freedmen who had little means of protecting themselves from the next
incarnation of slave patrols: the Ku Klux Klan.”).
40 See id.; sources cited supra note 38.
41 See Stevenson, supra note 38, at 11 (“[S]tates looked to the criminal justice system to
construct policies and strategies to maintain white supremacy and racial subordination. Law
enforcement officers were tasked with menacing and controlling black people in ways that would
shape policing and the criminal justice system in America for the next century.”).
42 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-73 (1961) (“The Ku Klux Act
grew out of a message sent to Congress by President Grant on March 23, 1871, reading: ‘A condition
of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering life and property insecure and the
carrying of the mails and the collection of the revenue dangerous. . . . Therefore, I urgently
recommend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and
property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United States.’”); Lawrence Rosenthal,
Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 70 (2003) (“The primary congressional
response to continued lawlessness in the postwar South was the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which
afforded civil and criminal remedies against both governmental and private action that deprived
individuals of civil rights.”); Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual
Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) (“Following the
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government officials who deprived them of constitutional rights.43 It was later
codified as a federal statute at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, giving the Act the shorthand
name used to refer to it today: § 1983. Congress passed this Act as an attempt
to create financial disincentives that would discourage local and state officials
from using their authority to terrorize Black communities.44 The statute
emerged out of and acted alongside the Reconstruction Amendments to
reconfigure the relationship between states and the federal government by
creating a legal mechanism that Black Americans could use to hold state actors
accountable for racialized violence and vindicate constitutional rights.45 The
mechanism implemented in § 1983 to facilitate greater accountability was a
new private cause of action that allowed individual plaintiffs to sue state and
local government officials who unlawfully deprived them of federal rights.46
The law potentially creates accountability by exposing these people and
officers to civil liability—money damages—when they violate the
constitution by, for example, using excessive force. The current text of the
statute at § 1983 reads, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .47

adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, . . . came the 1871 Civil Rights Act, aimed
specifically at the activities of the Ku Klux Klan. Section 1 of that Act, now § 1983, added civil
remedies. It provided a civil remedy for deprivations, under color of state law, of any of the rights,
privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution.”).
43 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
44 PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 197 (1st ed. 1999)
(“Congress utilized the powers granted by the Reconstruction amendments with three Enforcement
Acts, passed in 1870 and 1871. The first, known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, was aimed at the hooded
marauders who terrorized blacks across the South.”).
45 See id. (“Congress intended with this law to give federal judges the power to punish local
and state officials in the South—many of whom belonged to or collaborated with the Klan—who
prevented blacks from voting or exercising other civil rights.”); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171 (“Section
1979 came onto the books as § 1 of the Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871. It was one of the means whereby
Congress exercised the power vested in it by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the
provisions of that Amendment.” (citation omitted)); 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 822 (rev.
Aug. 2021) (“Congress’s enforcement power under the 14th Amendment is broad and includes the
authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed by the 14th Amendment by
prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by
the amendment’s text.”).
46 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
47 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
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The text does not, nor has it ever, included a defense of qualified
immunity for government officials, including police officers. From the law’s
beginning in 1871 through the 1960s, public officials were not entitled to
qualified immunity for § 1983 claims based on violations of federal
constitutional rights.48 Shortly after passing § 1983, the Supreme Court even
rejected the idea that Congress intended to immunize state officials facing
liability under the statute.49
B. Reemergence of § 1983
Section 1983 largely laid dormant Reconstruction, falling out of use for
decades. But in 1961, Monroe v. Pape reopened the door to using § 1983 to hold
government officials financially liable for violating constitutional rights.50
The plaintiffs in Monroe—a family of six Black children and their parents—
sued the City of Chicago and several Chicago police officers after the police
broke into their home without a warrant and ransacked the house while the
family was forced to stand naked in the living room.51 The officers also took
the father to the police station, where the officers detained him for ten hours
and subjected him to interrogation before allowing him to appear before a
magistrate or call an attorney.52 The plaintiffs sued the police officers and the

48 But see Scott Keller, Qualified and Absolute Immunity at Common Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1337,
1344 (2021) (“[H]istorical sources refute the prevailing view among modern commentators that
nineteenth-century cases did not recognize ‘a freestanding common-law defense’ for government
officers’ discretionary duties.”). Keller’s article surveys four treatises in use in 1871 to determine what
state common law immunities existed for public officials at the time Congress enacted § 1983. Id. at
1343. Keller argues that state law generally granted public officials immunity from liability for actions
performed as discretionary duties, so long as the official was not acting in bad faith or with an
improper purpose. Id. at 1344-45. Keller acknowledges that qualified immunity for federal § 1983
claims only began after the Court’s decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1968), but his claim is
that the immunities that existed at common law for state torts in the years leading up to the creation
of § 1983 provide a valid foundation for the creation of qualified immunity. Id. at 1389. William
Baude, however, challenges Keller’s claim that that state common law in 1871 contained immunities
akin to qualified immunity. See William Baude, Is Quasi-Judicial Immunity Qualified Immunity?, 73
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2021). Baude argues that Keller only shows that a “quasijudicial” good-faith defense existed at common law; this doctrine was distinct and distant from the
modern doctrine of qualified immunity for § 1983 claims. Id. (manuscript at 2). We discuss this
debate in further detail in infra Part III.
49 Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 30, at 1801-02 (“[T]he Supreme Court
expressly rejected a good faith defense to liability under Section 1983 after it became law.”); Baude, Is
Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, supra note 30, at 57 (discussing the Supreme Court’s rejection of the
application of a good faith defense under § 1983 claims in Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915)).
50 365 U.S. 167, 191-92 (1961).
51 Id. at 169.
52 Id.
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City of Chicago under § 1983 for violating their Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.53
The United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled
to bring a § 1983 claim for damages against the police officers for violating
their constitutional rights.54 A key part of the ruling held that government
officials could be liable for actions even if they were taken without official
state approval or authorization, and even if they were contrary to established
law, custom, and practice.55 This gave § 1983 a potentially broad scope.
Immediately after Monroe, the Court took up several cases regarding §
1983’s scope. The decisions in these cases interpreted the meaning of “state
action” and “color of state law,”56 allowed property and liberty interests to be
adjudicated under the statute,57 and determined that plaintiffs need not
exhaust state remedies before seeking relief.58 The initial years after Monroe
thus established that the statute expanded access to federal court remedies
for constitutional violations. At the same time the Court was defining the
scope of § 1983, it was also expanding substantive constitutional protections.59
Id. at 169-70.
Id. at 191-92. The Court in Monroe did dismiss the complaint against the city of Chicago,
finding that Congress did not intend the word “person” in § 1983 to apply to municipalities. Id. This
part of Monroe was later overruled in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell, the Court analyzed the legislative history of § 1983 and held that
municipalities were proper defendants in § 1983 cases, but only where “the action that is alleged to
be unconstitutional implements or executes” a municipal law, policy, or custom. Id. at 690. This
standard makes bringing a municipal liability claim difficult or impossible in many types of cases.
See Rudovsky, supra note 32, at 32; Eric Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 213, 266 (1979) (criticizing attempts to limit municipal liability).
55 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183-85.
56 See Rudovsky, supra note 32, at 24; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)
(“The involvement of a state official in such a conspiracy plainly provides the state action essential
to show a direct violation of petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, whether
or not the actions of the police were officially authorized, or lawful[.]”); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369, 380-81 (1967) (finding that a California statute constituted State action by “involv[ing] the State
in private discriminations.”); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-25 (1961)
(finding state action where a restaurant “operated as an integral part of a public building devoted to
a public parking service” discriminated against Black individuals).
57 See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (“The right to enjoy property
without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a
‘personal’ right, whether the ‘property’ in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings account.”).
58 See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982) (holding that exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not a prerequisite for § 1983 actions); McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S.
668, 676 (1963) (“When federal rights are subject to . . . tenuous protection, prior resort to a state
proceeding is not necessary.”).
59 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (Eighth Amendment); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (due process); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (Fourth
Amendment); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (Fourth Amendment); United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (Sixth Amendment); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264
(1964) (First Amendment, due process); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (equal
protection); see also Rudovsky, supra note 32, at 35-36 (examining the doctrine of qualified immunity
53
54
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With these parallel expansions after Monroe, § 1983 became an important
vehicle for enforcing constitutional rights in the United States.
At this point, claims that police used excessive force were litigated
through a variety of legal rules, although substantive due process became a
primary mechanism.60 By giving new life to § 1983, Monroe led to an upswing
in excessive force cases against the police.61 But only six years after confirming
that the Reconstruction-era Congress intended to provide a federal cause of
action to enforce liability for violations of constitutional rights committed
under color of state law, the Court placed significant constraints on § 1983 by
creating limited immunities for § 1983 claims. The Supreme Court would
later transform these limited immunities into the modern doctrine of
qualified immunity.
II. EMERGENCE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Soon after the Supreme Court opened the door for § 1983 to be invoked
in response to police brutality, it limited police officers’ exposure to civil
liability for misconduct by creating a new rule: qualified immunity. This Part
outlines the traditional story of how the Court developed the modern
doctrine of qualified immunity through three foundational cases.
In Pierson v. Ray, the Court first applied a limited immunity based on a
common law, good faith defense to false imprisonment.62 Then, in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, the Court rewrote the rules governing qualified immunity to create
the two-step objective qualified immunity test.63 Finally, in Pearson v.
Callahan, the court overturned a prior decision on qualified immunity—
Saucier v. Katz—thereby allowing courts to address questions about “clearly

and its impact on litigation of civil rights claims); Blackmun, supra note 42, at 19-20 (describing the
expanding significance of § 1983 in civil liberties litigation).
60 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), established the Fourth Amendment as the proper
basis for excessive force claims. As Obasogie and Newman have shown, litigants prior to the Graham
decision pursued claims through different legal avenues, including the Fourth Amendment,
standalone § 1983 claims, substantive due process, and the Equal Protection Clause. See Osagie K.
Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Futile Fourth Amendment: Understanding Police Excessive Force
Doctrine Through an Empirical Assessment of Graham v. Connor, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1465, 1485 (2018)
(analyzing claims asserted in excessive force cases before Graham).
61 See Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 781-93 (1979) (discussing
increase in number of police misconduct lawsuits from 1971 to 1979 and compiling case sample of §
1983 misconduct cases that shows majority of cases involved excessive force).
62 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). For a discussion regarding the debate about whether the common
law immunities from 1871 provide a valid foundation for the Court’s creation of qualified immunity
for § 1983 claims, see supra note 48 and infra Part III.
63 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982).
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established law” before determining the merits of the underlying
constitutional claim.64
A. Pierson v. Ray
Pierson v. Ray focused on the question of whether common law immunities
afforded to state officials in tort law should apply to state officials sued under
§ 1983 for constitutional violations.65 The plaintiffs in the case were a group
of white and Black clergymen and anti-segregation protesters.66 Police
arrested them for breaching the peace when they attempted to use segregated
facilities at a bus terminal in Jackson, Mississippi.67 After the Mississippi
segregation law was ruled unconstitutional, the protesters sued the officers
that arrested them, alleging that the officers were liable at common law for
false arrest and imprisonment and could be subject to a § 1983 lawsuit for
violating the protesters’ constitutional rights.68
To defend themselves from the case, the officers argued that they were
entitled to a limited immunity from both the false imprisonment state tort
claim and the federal § 1983 claim.69 Their argument was made in the shadow
of a prior case from 1951, where the Court had said that the common law of
1871 should govern interpretations of possible immunities to § 1983 claims as
applied to state legislators.70 The officers argued that the Mississippi common
law of 1871 provided police officers immunity from false imprisonment claims
if they act in “good faith” and with probable cause.71
At the Fifth Circuit, the Court of Appeals held that the officers could not
assert a “good faith and probable cause” defense to the § 1983 claim.72 The
court noted that the common law tort defense only applied to state torts, not

64 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 197 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 236 (2009).
65 386 U.S. 547, 556-57. We focus on Pierson’s discussion of executive branch official immunity
because it establishes the concept of qualified immunity to § 1983 for the first time. Id. at 555-57.
This case also involved a question about judicial immunity, and on that issue, the Court concluded
that judges are immune from § 1983 lawsuits that arise from judges performing their official duties.
Id. at 554-55. The ruling on judicial immunity relied on a prior case, which found that § 1983 made
state legislators immune from liability “as long as the deprivation of civil rights which they caused
a person occurred while the legislators ‘were acting in a field where legislators traditionally have
power to act.’” Id. at 559 (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951)).
66 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 549.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 550.
69 Id. at 555.
70 Brief for Respondents, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (No. 79), 1966 WL 115420, at *3236 (1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951).
71 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 551-52.
72 Id.

424

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170: 407

federal § 1983 claims.73 The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit
decision and held that the “good faith and probable cause” defense that
applied in state tort law also applied in the context of § 1983 claims based on
false arrest.74
The Court’s reason for creating this new immunity to § 1983 suits rested
on a statutory interpretation argument based entirely on the silence of
Congress with respect to immunities to § 1983 claims. The text of § 1983
clearly states that “[e]very person” who under color of state law violates
someone’s constitutional rights75 can be held liable. Despite this clear
guidance from the statute, the Court said the “prevailing view” at common
law is that police officers facing liability for the tort of false arrest could
invoke a “good faith and probable cause” defense.76 The Court assumed that
because some states had this common law defense, Congress intended for the
same defense to apply in the context of federal § 1983 claims.77 The Court’s
reasoning was confined, however, to one narrow exception for special
treatment: situations where an officer arrests an individual “acting under a
statute that he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held
unconstitutional, on its face or as applied.” 78
The Court’s decision to bring the “good faith and probable cause” defense
from common law false arrest doctrine into federal constitutional tort litigation
initiated what would soon become a robust doctrine of qualified immunity
insulating police officers from liability for their constitutional violations.79
Id. at 551.
Id. at 557.
An amendment added in 1996 prohibits the grant of injunctive relief against any judicial
officer acting in her or his official capacity “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory
relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
76 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555 (stating that what would become known as qualified immunity is
limited to this common law defense which immunizes police officers, provided they act in good faith
and with probable cause).
77 Id. at 557.
78 Id. at 555. Chief Justice Warren noted that “[a] policeman’s lot is not so unhappy that he
must choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has
probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does.” Id.
79 See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195-97 (2004) (per curiam) (overturning lower court
decision to deny qualified immunity to a police officer who shot plaintiff in the back); Plumhoff v.
Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 768-70 (2014) (granting qualified immunity to police officers who shot and killed
the driver and passenger in a “dangerous” fleeing car); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 9-11 (2015) (per
curiam) (granting qualified immunity to an officer who shot and killed a fleeing driver even after the
officer was ordered to “stand by” to see if spike strips would stop the car first); City and County of San
Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 603-06, 617 (2015) (granting qualified immunity to officers who
shot a mentally ill woman in her group home when she would not drop a knife); White v. Pauly, 137 S.
Ct. 548, 549-53 (2017) (per curiam) (granting immunity to an officer who shot an armed home occupant
during a standoff); Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1150-05 (2018) (per curiam) (granting immunity
to an officer who shot a mentally ill woman with a kitchen knife); City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139
S. Ct. 500, 501-04 (2019) (per curiam) (reversing lower court decision to grant immunity to an officer
73
74
75
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But it would have been hard for anyone to predict, based on the decision
in Pierson, that qualified immunity would grow into what it has become today.
For one thing, the Court’s reasoning here—that officers should not face civil
lawsuits when they enforce a statute that is legally valid at the time of the
incident—applied only in the limited context of an officer being sued for false
arrest when the statutory basis for the arrest is later deemed invalid. This
reasoning, as initially conceived, would not apply to other circumstances of
police misconduct, such as the use of excessive force.
Moreover, even if we rely on the weak justification for using common law
principles from 1871 to interpret § 1983, there is no reason to think that
Congress intended for § 1983 to provide an immunity to police officers,
especially in the context of excessive force. Critically, as the historical context
we detailed above makes clear, a key purpose of § 1983 was to hold state actors
accountable for their participation in racialized violence. When the
Reconstruction-Era Congress passed what has become § 1983, it wanted to
empower people to sue state and local officials for participating in racialized
brutality that violated constitutional rights in light of these officials failing to
do their jobs properly.80 Affording police immunity for using excessive force
undermines this very purpose.
Pierson may have aligned with common law principles for false arrest, but,
shortly afterwards, the Court started to substitute its own policy judgments
for the commands of both § 1983 and the Constitution.81 Between qualified

who forcibly took a man to the ground as he attempted to walk past them); City of Tahlequah v. Bond,
142 S. Ct. 9, 10-11 (2021) (per curiam) (reversing lower court decision to deny qualified immunity to
police who shot man with a hammer); see also Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting
the “disturbing trend” where the Court “routinely displays an unflinching willingness to summarily
reverse courts for wrongly denying officers the protection of qualified immunity but rarely intervene[s]
where courts wrongly afford officers the benefit of qualified immunity in these same cases.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
80 See Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV.
1323, 1334 (1952) (“On April 20, 1871, Congress passed another statute ‘to enforce the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.’ Known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, this statute was
the indignant reaction of Congress to the conditions in the southern states wherein the Klan and
other lawless elements were rendering life and property insecure. . . . [T]he person whose civil rights
were injured was given a civil cause of action against the officer who should have but did not protect
him, a provision which was specifically directed against lynching and other forms of mob violence.”
(footnotes omitted)).
81 See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L. J. 2, 8 (2017) [hereinafter
Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails] (“Although the concept of qualified immunity was drawn
from defenses existing in the common law at the time 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted, the Court has
made clear that the contours of qualified immunity’s protections are shaped not by the common law
but instead by policy considerations.”); see also Rudovsky, supra note 32, at 38. The Court shifted
toward public policy considerations in the case that immediately followed Pierson: Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308 (1975). In Wood, the Court cited “strong public-policy reasons” as grounds for extending
a “qualified good-faith” immunity to local school board officials. Id. at 318. Specifically, the Court
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immunity’s first appearances in 1967 and 1982, the Court extended this
defense to public officials in other contexts, including school board officials,
prison officials, mental health hospital administrators, and executive branch
cabinet officials.82
These cases demonstrate a shift in the Court’s reasoning. When first
introduced, qualified immunity was justified primarily on grounds of statutory
interpretation, with fidelity to analogous common law defenses in tort law.
However, in later cases from this period, the Court began channeling arguments
about economic and judicial efficiency to rationalize qualified immunity.83
B. Harlow v. Fitzgerald and Rewriting Qualified Immunity
The court created qualified immunity in Pierson, but the doctrine acquired
its modern form fifteen years later in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.84 While Harlow
worried that “[d]enying any measure of immunity in these circumstances ‘would contribute not to
principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.’” Id. at 319. It further said that:
The imposition of monetary costs for mistakes which were not unreasonable in the
light of all the circumstances would undoubtedly deter even the most conscientious
school decisionmaker from exercising his judgment independently, forcefully, and in
a manner best serving the long-term interest of the school and the students. The most
capable candidates for school board positions might be deterred from seeking office if
heavy burdens upon their private resources from monetary liability were a likely
prospect during their tenure.
Id. at 319-20. The Court’s decision in Harlow solidified its use of policy considerations to justify
qualified immunity. In the case, the petitioners argued that the Court should rewrite the rules of
qualified immunity based on a public policy argument that “permit[s] the defeat of insubstantial
claims” against public officials “without resort to trial.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813
(1982). The Court accepted the invitation to depart from whatever common law basis for qualified
immunity might exist in favor of public policy; it adopted a new qualified immunity rule based on
concerns about claims that “frequently run against” innocent public officials “at a cost not only to
the defendant officials, but to society as a whole.” Id. at 814. The Court also cited
social costs [that] include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy
from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of
public office. Finally, there is the danger that fear of being sued will “dampen the ardor
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties.”
Id. In light of these considerations, the Court adopted the modern two-part qualified immunity test
based on clearly established law as “the best attainable accommodation of competing values.” Id.
Justice Thomas has also described the modern evolution of qualified immunity doctrine as involving
“precisely the sort of ‘freewheeling policy choice[s]’ that we have previously disclaimed the power
to make.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring).
82 See Wood, 420 U.S. at 318 (extending a good faith qualified immunity to local school board
officials); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 556-67, 560, 563 (1978) (prison officials); O’Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 564, 577 (1975) (mental health hospital administrators); Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514-15 (1978) (federal executive level cabinet officials).
83 See infra Section II.B.
84 Harlow, 457 U.S. 800, 813-815 (1982).
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provides the foundation for today’s conception of qualified immunity for
police, the case had little to do with law enforcement. Rather, it concerned
two top-level executive aides to President Nixon.85 Fitzgerald testified in
Congress about financial fraud in the Nixon administration and was fired
shortly thereafter.86 He brought a Bivens claim87 against the two presidential
aides that fired him—Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield—on the
grounds that they unlawfully retaliated against him.88 Harlow and Butterfield
argued that, as government officials, they were immune from the
constitutional claims Fitzgerald brought against them.89
Up until this point, the Court recognized two types of immunity: absolute
immunity for legislators and judges performing their official functions and
qualified immunity for other public officials.90 The defendants wanted the
Court to grant the Presidential aides absolute immunity, but the Court
ultimately held that executive branch officials were only entitled to qualified
immunity.91 But the Court also went on to throw out the old qualified
immunity rules and issue entirely new ones. As we discussed above, at this
point, qualified immunity was available in the form of a “good faith”
affirmative defense under a subjective standard that imposed liability if an
officer “took the action[s] with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury.”92
The Court decided to adjust this rule because it did not facilitate dismissal
of “insubstantial” claims before trial.93 The decisions giving support to
qualified immunity in the years between Pierson and Harlow relied on new
arguments about the need to grant state officials discretion in decisionmaking
and the need for judicial and economic efficiency.94 The Harlow Court
Id. at 802.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 733-34 (1982).
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations committed by state actors.
There is no similar statute that applies to unconstitutional conduct of federal officials, but in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court held that
plaintiffs can bring a lawsuit against federal officials directly under the Fourth Amendment in federal
court. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388. Since then, the Court has extended Bivens to violations of other
constitutional protections, creating a private cause of action against federal officers for violations of
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16, 24-25 (1980) (Eighth Amendment);
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979) (Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
88 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802-05.
89 Id. at 808.
90 Absolute immunity for legislators and judges was supported because their “special functions
or constitutional status requires complete protection from suit . . . .” Id. at 807.
91 Id. at 809.
92 Id. at 815.
93 Id. at 813-15.
94 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 526-27 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (commenting that the limited qualified immunity provided would lead to
increases in litigation against government officials based on decisions made while in office); Scheuer
85
86
87
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expanded those arguments, weighing plaintiff ’s rights against the interests of
judicial expediency:
In situations of abuse of office, an action for damages may offer the only
realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees. At the same
time, however, it cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently run
against the innocent as well as the guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant
officials, but to society as a whole. These social costs include the expenses of
litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the
deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office. Finally, there is
the danger that fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching
discharge of their duties.95

The Court concluded that the subjective standard “proved incompatible”
with the idea “that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial” because
subjective intent is a factual determination that, if disputed, could not be
decided on motions for summary judgment.96 The Court then decided to
change qualified immunity to an entirely “objective” standard,97 which granted
immunity to “government officials performing discretionary functions . . .
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”98
This revision represents the Court’s first major transformation of
qualified immunity. Rather than using the common law from 1871 to justify
and model qualified immunity as done in Pierson, the Harlow Court made a
policy judgement rooted in a demand for efficiency and desire to protect the
state from litigation expenses. By stoking fears about costs and the limits of
public resources, the Court was able to rein in the power of § 1983 to hold
state actors accountable for their constitutional violations.
C. Pearson v. Callahan
To understand the significance of Pearson v. Callahan,99 it is helpful to
start with the case that Pearson overruled: Saucier v. Katz.100
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 246-47 (1974) (noting that greater immunity may need to be provided to
officials depending on the range of their responsibilities to empower official action).
95 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
96 Id. at 815-16.
97 Id. at 818 (“Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct . . . should avoid
excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on
summary judgment.” (footnote omitted)).
98 Id. at 818.
99 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
100 533 U.S. 194 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
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In 2001, the Court decided Saucier v. Katz, a qualified immunity case about
a federal officer that allegedly used excessive force on a protester.101 Saucier
settled a circuit split on whether the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
inquiry precluded questions about qualified immunity in § 1983 excessive force
claims, where plaintiffs allege that police violated their Fourth Amendment
rights.102 Before Saucier, the Supreme Court had applied qualified immunity
to Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims, meaning that officers could
be shielded from civil lawsuits when they performed illegal searches or
arrests.103 But the Supreme Court had not yet decided if the analysis regarding
qualified immunity was separate from or intertwined with assessments of the
constitutional violation in situations where someone alleges excessive force by
the police. As we discuss in more detail in Part VI, the key issue in the case
was whether the test for qualified immunity—which looks to the
reasonableness of an officer’s conduct measured by reference to “clearly
established law”104—was identical to the Fourth Amendment excessive force
test established in Graham v. Connor—which looks to whether an officer’s use
of force was reasonable under the circumstances105—such that a finding of
unreasonable force under the Fourth Amendment necessarily precludes the
officer from being entitled to qualified immunity.106 The Saucier Court held
that “reasonableness” must be analyzed differently in the two contexts, such
that an officer could have acted unreasonably and used excessive force but have
acted reasonably with respect to following clearly established law and still be
entitled to qualified immunity.107

Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 197. Some courts believed that that qualified immunity did not apply because (1) the
law clearly established that excessive force is unlawful, and (2) the immunity analysis collapsed into
the excessive force inquiry as both inquiries looked to the reasonableness of the police officer’s
actions; other courts, however, believed that officers could be entitled to qualified immunity in cases
where the officer had a reasonable but mistaken belief that the force used was reasonable. See infra
subsection V.A.1 (discussing the pre-Saucier circuit split on the issue of whether qualified immunity
applied in excessive force cases).
103 See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (extending qualified immunity to
an FBI agent who conducted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335 344-45 (1986) (holding that qualified immunity applies in cases of unconstitutional arrest
pursuant to an objective reasonableness standard).
104 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
105 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of
force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindsight.”).
106 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 203-05 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223 (2008).
107 Id. at 204 (“The inquiries for qualified immunity and excessive force remain distinct, even
after Graham.”).
101
102
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In reaching this conclusion, the court clarified that the qualified immunity
test involves two distinct steps.108 In the first step, the court conducts a factual
inquiry into whether a constitutional violation occurred.109 If a constitutional
violation is established in step one, then the court moves to the second step,
where the court determines the objective reasonableness of the officer’s
actions by conducting a legal inquiry into whether the constitutional right the
defendant violated was “clearly established” at the time the violation
occurred.110 The sequencing of these two steps was a critical issue in Saucier.
The Supreme Court in Saucier held that the qualified immunity test must
always begin with the question of whether a constitutional violation occurred,
and only then, after an affirmative finding at that step, could the court move
on to the second question of whether the violated right was clearly
established.111 Put differently, the qualified immunity test had to be
performed in that particular order. The Court justified this sequencing rule
on the basis of judicial efficiency, as there was no reason to look to the
question of clearly established law if there was no underlying constitutional
violation for which an officer needed to invoke qualified immunity.112 But the
Court also justified the sequencing on the grounds that it promoted the
“elaboration from case to case” of constitutional principles and prevented
constitutional stagnation.113 As the Saucier Court wrote, “the law might be
deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the question
whether the law clearly established that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in
the circumstances of the case.”114
With this backdrop in mind, we now move back to Pearson v. Callahan,
which involved a challenge to the Saucier rule mandating the sequence of the
qualified immunity test steps.115 Pearson ultimately ended the mandatory
sequencing rule, giving courts the option to decide the question of clearly
established law before determining whether an underlying constitutional
violation occurred.116 The majority wrote:
108 Id. at 201 (“A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider, then,
this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the
facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial
inquiry. . . . If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established,
there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. On the other hand, if a
violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step
is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” (citation omitted)).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 202.
113 Id. at 201.
114 Id.
115 555 U.S. 223 (2008).
116 Id. at 236.
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[W]hile the sequence set forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no
longer be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the district courts and the
courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in
deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should
be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.117

The court decided to overrule Saucier on the grounds that the sequencing
rule provided “little if any conservation of judicial resources.”118 In fact, the
Court said that judicial resources are often wasted by starting with the
question of whether a constitutional right had been violated.119 If there was
no clearly established law on the issue, the Court reasoned, then there was no
reason for the Court to spend time deliberating over whether or not the
defendant violated a constitutional right.120
Pearson therefore introduced a second transformation to qualified
immunity by allowing courts to pursue the question of clearly established law
before asking the question of whether a constitutional violation occurred.
This transformation ultimately pushed aside what usually was the key
question in a § 1983 case—whether a constitutional violation actually
happened—and put questions of whether a right is “clearly established” at the
forefront of qualified immunity analyses. The decision to overrule Saucier also
helped to overshadow the more substantive impact of the case regarding
excessive force.
We will revisit Saucier in Part VII to show that even though the Court
overruled the part of the decision about mandatory sequencing, the key
holding about excessive force is still with us today.121
*

*

*

Legal scholars have written extensively on the impact of Pierson, Harlow,
and Pearson on § 1983 cases, configuring these three cases as the modern
framework for qualified immunity.122 Scholarly literature following this
traditional view of the history of qualified immunity is often critical of the
doctrine’s emergence in Pierson and transformations under Harlow and
Pearson, but it does not fully explore the particular ways that qualified
immunity came to apply to cases regarding police use of force. In the next
Part, we provide an overview of scholarly perspectives on qualified immunity
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id.
Id.
Id. at 236-37.
Id. at 237.
See infra Part VII.
See sources cited supra note 30.
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and explain how this Article provides a novel account of how qualified
immunity emerged in excessive force doctrine.
III. SCHOLARLY PERSPECTIVES ON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Part II examined the doctrinal evolutions and policy choices made by
federal courts that led qualified immunity to emerge as a viable defense to
constitutional tort claims. How have legal scholars discussed these
transformations? Two topics tend to occupy the literature on qualified
immunity: a debate about the validity of qualified immunity doctrine itself and
a debate about the sequencing of the qualified immunity test. What’s missing
from this field is an understanding of how qualified immunity specifically
became attached to police excessive force doctrine. Existing literature
acknowledges the critical role that qualified immunity plays in excessive force
cases today, but it has yet to provide an account of the doctrinal history of how
excessive force became so closely entangled with qualified immunity. This
literature also lacks an empirical assessment of the growing relationship
between qualified immunity and excessive force. This gap implies that
excessive force has been a natural part of qualified immunity doctrine from the
beginning. Our Article reveals, however, that this narrative obscures the
political nature of qualified immunity as the Supreme Court explicitly applied
it for the first time in 2001 as a shield for police officers who used excessive
force. The discussion in this Part highlights how our argument about the nature
and impact of the decision to create qualified immunity for excessive force
builds on and extends the important work done so far in this field.
A. Debates on the Merits of Qualified Immunity
The landscape of recent qualified immunity legal scholarship is primarily
occupied by criticisms and defenses of the doctrine. Critics have attacked
both its legal foundations and its empirical justifications. The doctrine’s
supporters offer conditional defenses that keep the rule generally intact but
in a modified form.
Joanna Schwartz and William Baude have both published important
critiques of the doctrine in recent years.123 Schwartz has primarily contributed
123 See generally Baude, supra note 48; Joanna Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L.
REV. 309 (2020) [hereinafter Schwartz, After Qualified Imminuity] (arguing that abolishing qualified
immunity would pose multiple benefits, including clarifying the law, reducing litigation costs, and
focusing § 1983 analysis to whether officials have overstepped their authority); Schwartz, The Case
Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 30, (arguing for an overhaul of qualified immunity doctrine);
Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, supra note 30, (asserting that most rationales evoked to justify
modern qualified immunity doctrine are largely unconvincing); Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity
Fails, supra note 30 (questioning assumptions underlying the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity
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extensive empirical research examining whether the policy justifications the
Court uses to ground qualified immunity have merit, while Baude has
generally focused more on the doctrinal question of whether qualified
immunity has a sound legal basis.
In How Qualified Immunity Fails, Schwartz shows that qualified immunity
generally does not achieve its purported policy aims. She reviewed 1,183 §
1983 cases in federal district court and counted how often defendants brought
qualified immunity motions in courts, the frequency with which district
courts granted the motions, and whether the motions led to the dismissal of
cases before discovery and trial.124 Schwartz found that of the cases where
qualified immunity could be asserted against defendants only 3.9% were
actually dismissed on this basis.125 Of the cases specifically involving law
enforcement defendants, only 0.6% were dismissed on a motion to dismiss
and 2.6% on a motion for summary judgment.126 Given these findings,
Schwartz concluded that qualified immunity failed to serve its intended
purpose of shielding public officials from the burden of discovery and trial.127
Schwartz followed this empirical study on qualified immunity with a 2018
article arguing for the elimination of qualified immunity given that it has no
basis in common law, it is ineffective in achieving its policy goals, and it
hinders development of substantive constitutional protections.128 In 2019,
Schwartz published another piece on qualified immunity that offers five
predictions about what would happen if the Court followed the call to reform
qualified immunity.129 Schwartz contends that if her predictions are right,
eliminating qualified immunity would not substantially change constitutional
protections or their coverage, but would “clarify the law, make litigation more
efficient, increase the number of suits filed, and shift the focus of [§ 1983]

jurisprudence). Kit Kinports’ The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity also offers a
critical examination of the legal evolution of qualified immunity doctrine, combing through the
Court’s decisions in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011), City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan,
575 U.S. 600 (2015), and Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014), to show how the Court “engaged
in a pattern of covertly broadening the defense, describing it in increasingly generous terms and
inexplicably adding qualifiers to precedent that then take on a life of their own.” 100 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES 62, 64-65 (2016). However, in doing this, Kinports does not fully explicate how qualified
immunity came to apply to police excessive use of force cases—an argument and examination that we
provide in this Article. Kinports does, however, explore how the Court changed its characterization
of the standard governing the qualified immunity defense and whether lower court opinions can create
clearly established law changed through these cases. Id. at 67-72.
124 Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 81, at 9.
125 Id. at 10.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 9-10, 71.
128 Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 30, at 1799-1800.
129 Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, supra note 123, at 316.
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litigation to what should be the critical question at issue in these cases—
whether government officials have exceeded their constitutional authority.”130
William Baude’s first major piece criticizing qualified immunity, Is
Qualified Immunity Unlawful,131 argues that the three justifications the
Supreme Court has offered for imposing qualified immunity fail. Those
justifications are, first, that the doctrine of qualified immunity emerges out
of a common law “good-faith” defense available in 1871 when Congress created
§ 1983.132 Baude argues such a defense did not exist at common law at that
time.133 The second justification is that it makes up for an earlier error in
expanding the scope of § 1983.134 Baude says that there was no error made.135
The third justification is that it offers “fair warning” to state actors, not unlike
the rule of lenity.136 Baude argues that there’s no legal justification for having
this protection for government officials.137
These criticisms of qualified immunity engendered responses from
several scholars defending the legal basis of qualified immunity doctrine.
Aaron L. Nielson and Christopher J. Walker speak directly to Schwartz and
Baude’s criticisms in A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity.138 They argue
that Baude’s conclusions about qualified immunity fail because stare decisis
applies with “special force” in the realm of qualified immunity, as “the
judiciary has great[] discretion to create defenses” to causes of action against
public officials.139 They also reject the argument that qualified immunity is in
tension with the history of § 1983 and propose that the history is “murky”
and “calls out for additional historical examination and analysis.”140 As to
Schwartz’s empirical arguments, Nielson and Walker point out some
methodological limitations to her study, and argue that to the extent that her
empirical work supports policy arguments against qualified immunity in the
§ 1983 context, they “should be directed to Congress, not the Court.”141
Scott A. Keller’s 2021 article Qualified and Absolute Immunity at Common
Law also responds to Schwartz and Baude’s arguments and defends the
doctrine on the basis that it is, or at least could be, consistent with the
Id. at 316.
Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, supra note 30, at 58-59.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 69-72.
See id. at 77 (“If the only legal basis for qualified immunity doctrine is as an extension of
the lenity and fair warning principles, then the doctrine needs to be radically overhauled.”).
138 Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853 (2018) [hereinafter Nielson & Walker, A Qualified Defense].
139 Id. at 1855.
140 Id. at 1864-68.
141 Id. at 1877-80.
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
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common law when Congress enacted § 1983.142 Keller concludes that the
common law in 1871 recognized a form of qualified immunity that protected
all government officers in their performance of discretionary duties.143 The
immunity, however, differed from qualified immunity in its modern form.144
First, courts started from an assumption that the immunity applied and the
plaintiff carried the burden of showing it should be set aside.145 Second, to
get past qualified immunity, plaintiffs had to show that the defendant acted
with bad faith or improper motive—akin to a subjective test like that under
Pierson—rather than the modern objective test in Harlow.146
Keller also argues that the common law rules regarding immunities from
1871 offer a useful guide for thinking about how to reform modern qualified
immunity.147 The subjective bad faith test would make it easier for courts to
dismiss insubstantial claims while still providing plaintiffs with a remedy
when public officials “grossly breach their public duties.”148
Though Keller carefully combs through treatises on official immunities from
around 1871 and cites to a few sources from this period that generally discuss the
police or sheriffs, it is worth noting that he does not give any attention to the
historical treatment of excessive force specifically.149 Keller’s article synthesizes
some trends from state tort cases on immunities in 1871.150 Yet, he does not
address prior research that specifically looked at whether state tort law granted
law enforcement immunity in cases involving excessive force.151
Ilan Wurman’s Qualified Immunity and Statutory Interpretation analyzed
state tort law beginning in 1871 to better understand the common law rules
governing police use of force.152 He shows that the common law rules on
excessive force at that time do not resemble any of the qualified immunity
rules for § 1983 excessive force claims.153 Wurman found that nearly all cases
Keller, supra note 48, at 1344-47.
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1378.
Id. at 1375-77.
Id. at 1358-59, 1388-89, 1398.
Id. at 1347.
Id.
Id. at 1364-66, 1372-75.
Id. at 1373-75.
See Ilan Wurman, Qualified Immunity and Statutory Interpretation, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
939, 964-72 (2014) (unearthing a rich common law history of excessive force cases and finding “no
immunities beyond those the jury was willing to grant”).
152 See id. at 939. (“[This Article] describe[s] the evolution of qualified immunity doctrine and
demonstrates how common law immunities were . . . incorporated into § 1983 by the Congress of
1871 . . . .”).
153 See id. at 972 (“The common law had a very different approach to excessive force cases. The
test was objective rather than subjective, like modern doctrine, but it was emphatically the province
of the jury to decide the reasonableness of the action. There were no immunities beyond those the
jury was willing to grant, and the officer was to be personally liable or indemnified by the state.”).
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
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and authorities from the time agreed that the test for immunity in an
excessive force suit was whether the force was “of necessity to accomplish a
given lawful purpose,” a question that had to be determined by a jury, and
that “[s]ubjective intent and good faith [were] featured in some cases, but this
was rare.”154 Thus, officer liability was determined by the objective question:
“Did the officer use as much force as was necessary to accomplish his purpose,
and no more?,” recognizing that “[t]here were no immunities beyond those
the jury was willing to grant.”155
Baude’s response to Keller’s defense of qualified immunity similarly shows
how Keller’s argument obscures the differences between historical
immunities that existed in 1871 and modern qualified immunity.156 Baude
demonstrates that historical immunities “protected quasi-judicial acts like
election administration and tax assessment, not ordinary law enforcement
decisions.”157 And officials who were covered under this quasi-judicial
immunity were not entitled to the immunity when they exceeded their
authority, including, Baude argues, when they violated the Constitution.158
Further, when the immunity did apply it was not, as it is today, an immunity
from suit. Rather, it was an available defense that required defendants to show
that they acted in good faith.159 Keller’s article recognizes some of these
distinctions between historical immunities and today’s qualified immunity,
but Baude’s discussion of the extent of the differences clarifies that the Court
has not simply reshaped a previously existing historical doctrine. Instead, it
has imagined and created modern qualified immunity from scratch.
B. Pearson, Saucier, and the Sequencing Debate
A second subset of qualified immunity literature focuses on the debate
about the sequence of the two parts of the qualified immunity test. Most legal
commentary on these decisions has focused on the impact that the sequencing
154 Id. at 971-72 (citing Murdock v. Ripley, 35 Me. 472, 474 (1853); State v. Mahon, 3 Del. (3
Harr.) 568, 569 (1842); Bellows v. Shannon, 2 Hill 86, 90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841); State v. Stalcup, 24
N.C. (2 Ired.) 50, 52 (1841)).
155 Wurman, supra note 151, at 971-72.
156 See Baude, supra note 48, (manuscript at 2) (explaining that the good faith defense Keller
described applied to “quasi-judicial” acts and that quasi-judicial immunity is “very different from
modern qualified immunity, which generally applies across the board to all of the official acts for
which a government actor might be sued.”).
157 Id. (manuscript at 1).
158 See id. (manuscript at 7-8) (“The Constitution was understood to set a limit to lawful official
action and officials who exceeded constitutional limits were thought to enjoy no residual discretion
within which to act lawfully or, in Keller’s terms, no immunity from suit.” (quoting James E. Pfander,
Zones of Discretion at Common Law (Northwestern Univ. Pritzker Sch. Of L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory
Series, Working Paper No. 20-27, 2020))).
159 Id. (manuscript at 9-10).
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rule might have on the development of constitutional law.160 Nancy Leong’s
The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis offers an
empirical assessment of whether the sequencing rule has led courts to more
frequently decide or elaborate on the contours of constitutional rights.161
Leong finds that mandatory sequencing did not give rise to an increase in
decisions for plaintiffs, meaning that the cases did not expand or describe new
constitutional rights.162
Similarly, Aaron Nielson and Christopher J. Walker published an
empirical study of the effects of the Pearson decision that was motivated by,
among other things, the concern that the rule change in Pearson would lead
to “constitutional stagnation.”163 Their study examines over 800 federal
appellate court decisions and finds that in approximately one quarter of cases,
courts decided the law was not clearly established without addressing the
underlying constitutional claim.164 They also find that after Pearson, it was less
likely that a court would find that a constitutional violation did occur, but
that the law was not clearly established.165 They argue that consequently,
while constitutional law would still continue to develop post-Pearson, there is
“some support” for concerns that constitutional law regarding police use of
force will stall.166
Other articles also engaged this question concerning law’s
underdevelopment. Colin Rolfs’s Qualified Immunity After Pearson v. Callahan
compares district court and circuit court decisions on qualified immunity postPearson. He finds that only circuit courts have trended toward dismissing cases
without deciding the underlying constitutional issue.167 However, Ted Sampsell

160 See generally Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2015) (noting the impacts of Pearson’s procedural rules, particularly the sequence of
its two-part test, on the development of substantive constitutional law); Nancy Leong, The Saucier
Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667 (2009) (arguing that
“mandatory sequencing does not correspond to any increase in the rate at which courts find for
plaintiffs” in qualified immunity cases); Colin Rolfs, Comment, Qualified Immunity After Pearson v.
Callahan, 59 UCLA L. REV. 468, 474 (2011) (“[W]hether courts use their Pearson discretion has . . .
to do with whether a court is interested in producing constitutional law.”).
161 Leong, supra note 160.
162 Id. at 670.
163 See Nielson & Walker, supra note 160, at 6 (noting that courts continue to “find
constitutional violations yet grant qualified immunity less frequently now . . . than they did before
Pearson,” creating “obvious” substantive consequences).
164 Id. at 33-34.
165 Id. at 35-36. They describe these as the “pure Saucier” cases because they are cases that
would be more likely to occur when the court had to first determine if a constitutional violation
occurred before moving on to clearly established law. Id. at 38.
166 Id. at 38.
167 Rolfs, supra note 160, at 474 (“Circuit courts have begun to use the discretion granted by
Pearson to avoid constitutional determinations far more than they did under the Saucier sequencing
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Jones and Jenna Yaunch come to a somewhat different conclusion in their study
of Pearson in the two years following the decision. After examining every circuit
court decision that cited Pearson in 2009 and 2010, they find that these courts
mostly “continue to follow the sequenced Saucier framework” and issued
rulings on the underlying constitutional issue.168 Michael Kirkpatrick and
Joshua Matz’s work generally defends the evolution of the qualified immunity
doctrine from Saucier to Pearson and offers “only minor reforms” to what they
describe as an “otherwise well-functioning procedural framework.”169
This review of the literature on Saucier and Pearson highlights the
extensive empirical research legal scholars have conducted on the issue of
whether allowing courts to skip over the underlying constitutional question
in a qualified immunity case hinders the development of constitutional
principles. But, as we discuss next, legal scholars’ fixation on sequencing and
the characterization of Pearson as overturning Saucier obscures the fact that
another aspect of Saucier is alive and well: the decision to unequivocally allow
qualified immunity to exist as a separate judicial inquiry apart from questions
about constitutional violations in § 1983 excessive forces cases, “which creates
additional barriers to police accountability. Indeed, legal scholarship on
qualified immunity has largely failed to fully acknowledge the impact of the
Court’s decision in Saucier to transform the nature of police use of force cases
by resolving what was then a contested circuit split and making qualified
immunity an available defense that is separate from inquiries into whether
the use of force violates the Fourth Amendment. This Article is the first to
revisit the full history of how excessive force became entangled with qualified
immunity and to provide an empirical assessment of how the doctrine was
transformed by that history.
C. Overlooking How Qualified Immunity Became Attached to Excessive Force
The aforementioned literature has made important contributions that
track the traditional story of qualified immunity’s history that emphasizes the
significance of Pierson, Harlow, and Pearson.170 But does this traditional
rule. District courts, on the other hand, are avoiding constitutional determinations at a level similar
to the Saucier period.”).
168 Ted Sampsell-Jones & Jenna Yauch, Measuring Pearson in the Circuits, 80 FORDHAM L.
REV. 623, 625 (2011).
169 “Our view is born of the conviction that recent [qualified immunity] cases have achieved a
desirable balance amongst competing considerations of fairness, efficiency, and the need to refine
constitutional law. It is also born of fear that some of the Court’s more conservative members may soon
imperil this compromise. Refinement, not redesign, is the best path forward for the Court’s qualified
immunity jurisprudence.” Kirkpatrick & Matz, Avoiding Permanent Limbo, supra note 30, at 643.
170 See, e.g., Keller, supra note 48, at 1340 (introducing the common law foundations of qualified
immunity with a discussion of racialized police violence and qualified immunity); Baude, Is Qualified
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narrative account for the specific history concerning the relationship between
qualified immunity and excessive force?
Many qualified immunity articles talk about the doctrine as a shield for
police officers facing civil liability for allegedly using unlawful amounts of
force. Indeed, these articles commonly begin with an introduction that
examines the connection between qualified immunity and police use of force
and discuss the high stakes associated with the doctrine in light of its link to
police accountability.171 But while legal scholars have emphasized the role
qualified immunity plays in excessive force cases today, nearly all of them fail
to acknowledge the contested history of qualified immunity in excessive force
cases or the fact that it was only in Saucier v. Katz that the Supreme Court
resolved a circuit split and definitively held that qualified immunity could
apply in excessive force cases.172 A few specific examples from the literature
demonstrate this point.
Joanna Schwartz’s scholarship has contributed enormously to our
understanding of how qualified immunity fails to achieve on its purported
policy objectives in use of force litigation173 and how state and local
governments indemnify individual police officers found liable in civil rights
lawsuits.174 Her work relies on an analysis of the history of qualified immunity
that follows the traditional narrative concerning the shifts from a subjective
to an objective standard in Pierson to Harlow and the shifts regarding the
sequencing rules in Saucier and Pearson.175 While revealing critical
information about the existing relationship between excessive force and
qualified immunity, Schwartz’s scholarship spends less time engaging with
the history that brought this relationship to fruition. In Police
Indemnification—which focuses on the extent to which civil liability has the
Immunity Unlawful?, supra note 30, at 48 (citing increasing awareness of police excessive force as an
example that “illustrate[s] the costs of unaccountability”); Nielson & Walker, supra note 160, at 3
(introducing qualified immunity with story of excessive force case where police tased the plaintiff
in her home).
171 See, e.g., Keller, supra note 48, at 1340 (introducing the common law foundations of qualified
immunity with a discussion of racialized police violence and qualified immunity); Baude, Is Qualified
Immunity Unlawful?, supra note 30, at 48 (citing increasing awareness of police excessive force as an
example that “illustrate[s] the costs of unaccountability”); Nielson & Walker, supra note 160, at 3
(introducing qualified immunity with story of excessive force case where police tased the plaintiff
in her home).
172 See infra Section V.A. for a discussion of this history; Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 197
(2001), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2008).
173 See Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 81, at 11 (“[Q]ualified immunity is
not achieving its policy objectives . . . .”).
174 See Joanna Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 30, at 887 (studying the extent to
which law enforcement officials are indemnified in police misconduct).
175 See, e.g., id. at 892-95 (assessing the development of qualified immunity doctrine); Schwartz,
The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 30, at 1802, 1814-15 (expounding on doctrinal
developments).
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potential to influence the behavior of individual officers—Schwartz
importantly emphasizes the need for further studies of qualified immunity’s
development in relation to police. But she also describes Harlow as the case
that “extended qualified immunity”176 to law enforcement even though
Harlow involved immunity for executive-branch officials in President Nixon’s
administration—a context that differs from situations that characteristically
involve state and local police officers using force.177 It was only later that the
Supreme Court explicitly imported the modern qualified immunity test
created in Harlow into the context of policing,178 and even later that it
imported the test to excessive force specifically.179
Schwartz also argues that one of the “foundational assumptions underlying
the Court’s qualified immunity doctrine” is that “the threat of personal
liability would have a debilitating effect on law enforcement officers’
decisionmaking.”180 The fact that the Court did not unequivocally apply
qualified immunity to excessive force cases until Saucier complicates the
picture of qualified immunity as being, from the start, a doctrine grounded in
policy decisions about police decision-making. While Schwartz discusses
Saucier in several of her articles, her focus is on the case’s decision on
sequencing,181 rather than the cases’ extension of qualified immunity to
excessive force.
William Baude’s Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful? also begins with a
discussion of increasing awareness of police excessive force, talks about how
qualified immunity in this context “illustrate[s] the costs of unaccountability,”
and highlights calls from advocates to reform qualified immunity in light of
police violence.182 But Baude’s history of qualified immunity, like Schwartz’s,
tells the traditional story of how the Court “tinkered” with the doctrine
without addressing how the Court brought excessive force under the doctrine’s

176 Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 30, at 889 (“[Harlow is] a decision that extended
qualified immunity to police officers based in part on the assumption that they were personally
responsible for settlements and judgments against them . . . .”).
177 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 802-06, 809 (1982) (“It is no disparagement of the
offices held by petitioners to hold that Presidential aides, like Members of the Cabinet, generally
are entitled only to a qualified immunity.”).
178 See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339 (1986) (applying the Harlow test to police defendants).
179 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (applying principles of Harlow to an excessive
force case), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2008).
180 Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 30, at 894 (emphasis added).
181 See id. at 893 n.37 (“The Court, in Saucier v. Katz, required judges to decide whether an
officer’s conduct was unconstitutional before deciding whether the unconstitutionality of his conduct
was clearly established.”); Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 81, at 16-17 (elaborating
on the Saucier Court’s holding with respect to the order of inquiries).
182 Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, supra note 30, at 48.
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purview.183 While Baude mentions Saucier once in the text of the article, he
describes it only as a case that “created a special sequencing requirement.”184
Similarly, Scott Keller’s article on common law immunities from 1871
begins with a discussion of the relationship between contemporary instances
of racialized police violence and qualified immunity.185 But it does not give
any attention to the historical treatment of excessive force specifically, nor
does it mention that modern qualified immunity has only recently become a
significant aspect of § 1983 excessive force litigation.
Nielson and Walker also start their article The New Qualified Immunity by
discussing excessive force.186 However, they only explore the legacy of Saucier
in terms of its sequencing rule and do not mention that it was the first
Supreme Court decision about excessive force and qualified immunity.187 In
a different article, Nielson and Walker focus on examining the connection
between qualified immunity at common law and today’s protections for police
facing civil liability.188 Yet, their history overlooks the decades where there
was no certainty across federal courts about whether qualified immunity had
any place in excessive force doctrine.189
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.’s article, Asking the Right Questions About Officer
Immunity similarly obscures the history of qualified immunity and excessive
force by describing qualified immunity as “trans-substantive” in the sense that
“it applies equally to suits to enforce the First Amendment, the Fourth
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and every other justiciable
provision of the Constitution.”190
There are, however, some exceptions to the general trend of treating
qualified immunity as a permanent fixture in excessive force law. Two of these
exceptions are relatively older articles that were published in the wake of
Harlow, well before the Supreme Court heard its first case on excessive force
and qualified immunity. First, Kathryn R. Urbonya’s Problematic Standards of
Reasonableness: Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Actions for a Police Officer’s
Use of Excessive Force focused specifically on the application of Harlow to
Id. at 81.
Id.
See Keller, supra note 48, at 1340 (discussing the heightened debate about qualified
immunity following high-profile incidents of police use of force against racial minorities in 2020).
186 Nielson & Walker, supra note 160, at 3 (describing a 2011 case about police use of excessive force).
187 Id. at 17 (“And then came the watershed in 2001: Saucier v. Katz. There, the Court held that
constitutional questions must be decided first.” (footnote omitted)).
188 They write, for example, “from the earliest days of the republic, American law has
sometimes shied away from holding government officials liable for reasonable mistakes. Indeed, the
Fourth Amendment itself is not violated when an officer makes such a reasonable mistake.” Nielson
& Walker, A Qualified Defense, supra note 138, at 1864.
189 Id. at 1864-68.
190 Fallon, Jr., supra note 30, at 480.
183
184
185
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excessive force cases.191 The article was published after the Court’s landmark
decision in Tennessee v. Garner but before the Court’s decision in Graham v.
Connor, during a time of uncertainty about how qualified immunity worked
in the excessive force context.192 Urbonya’s article focuses on how the Court
modified the “reasonableness” standard in the qualified immunity test after
Harlow to make it more fact specific and how this shift made qualified
immunity an “unnecessary defense to a [F]ourth [A]mendment claim
challenging the use of excessive force because the standard for liability is
identical to the standard for qualified immunity; both question whether a
reasonable officer would have believed that the use of force was necessary.”193
Second, David Rudovsky’s The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme
Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights discusses the
early history of § 1983 and modern qualified immunity, focusing particularly
on the impact of Harlow and a subsequent 1987 case Anderson v. Creighton.194
While the article deals with a variety of civil rights claims, such as those
arising under the First Amendment and antidiscrimination law, it offers early
insights into the application of the clearly established law standard in
excessive force cases. Rudovsky points out that while excessive force cases
“may present different facts . . . [the] well-established legal standard remains
the same”195—was the force reasonable under the circumstances? And because
of this, it seems that “[a] finding of unreasonable use of force establishes the
constitutional claim and defeats immunity.”196 Rudovsky correctly predicts
191 See Urbonya, supra note 32, at 90-91 (“Application of the Harlow standard to excessive force
claims under the [F]ourth and [F]ourteenth [A]mendments indicates that qualified. Immunity is
not available as a defense.”).
192 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
193 Urbonya, supra note 32, at 66-67.
194 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Rudovsky, supra note 32, at 47 (“Anderson v. Creighton swept away these
decisions and created an additional basis for the qualified immunity defense . . . .”). Rudovsky says
Harlow focused on the applicable legal norms, thereby limiting qualified immunity to situations
where officers were acting with specific constitutional guidance. Id. at 49. However, he notes that
Anderson added a “conduct” component to the qualified immunity analysis that looks to “whether
the conduct had been previously clearly proscribed in a setting where the constitutional standard
itself is defined by notions of reasonableness.” Id. (emphasis added). Rudovsky criticizes this
formulation of qualified immunity on several levels, arguing that it (a) potentially redefines
substantive constitutional law, and (b) “unnecessarily subordinates constitutional protections to
interests of governmental efficiency.” Id. at 52, 77. He also uses the example of excessive force to
argue against the idea that a broad immunity standard is necessary to protect against
“overdeterrence.” See id. at 77 (“According to this theory, if officials are accountable in damages when
the proper course of conduct is not clearly predictable, the officials will steer too far from the line,
resulting in a loss of governmental effectiveness.”). He says that the substantive constitutional rule
for excessive force already balances the government interests in being able to carry out duties with
a significant margin of error because officers do not face liability if they reasonably believed that
force was necessary under the circumstances. Id. at 77-78.
195 Id. at 59.
196 Id. at 59.
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that the Court’s decision in Anderson would undermine this argument, as the
Court found in the context of a Fourth Amendment search case that
“reasonableness” for the Fourth Amendment and for qualified immunity are
“analytically different concepts.”197
The only article that deals directly with the legacy of the Court’s decision
to bring qualified immunity into excessive force law is Diana Hassel’s
Excessive Reasonableness, which expands on early arguments about the
problems with applying qualified immunity to excessive force cases.198 Hassel
argues that Fourth Amendment doctrine combined with qualified immunity
created an “an almost impenetrable barrier to liability” for excessive force by
creating “two layers” of protection for police.199 The first layer, qualified
immunity, protects police if their actions are deemed to be objectively
reasonable, and the second, Fourth Amendment law, protects police if the
force used is similarly thought to be objectively reasonable.200 Hassel calls
this double-layer of protection “excessive reasonableness.”201
*

*

*

As these examples show, the traditional narrative fails to address the years
of uncertainty about qualified immunity in excessive force cases and masks
the central role of Saucier in solidifying and legitimating the doctrine in §
1983 suits regarding police use of excessive force. The inattention to this
history suggests that qualified immunity’s role in excessive force litigation is
part of a natural, benign doctrinal evolution rather than an abrupt choice
deliberately made as part of federal courts’ deference to police that ultimately
shields them from civil lawsuits in all but the most extreme cases of police
violence. Moreover, treating Saucier as a case about sequencing rather than a
case about excessive force has also obscured the broader questions of why and
how qualified immunity became prominent in this context.
Does the traditional story of qualified immunity map on to the empirical
evidence about the rise of qualified immunity in the context of excessive force
cases? We sampled over 500 district court qualified immunity cases to develop
a better sense of how the doctrine became such an integral aspect of excessive
force litigation. Unlike other studies that have looked at the impact of
qualified immunity cases with a variety of underlying claims,202 our study
Id.
Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117, 118 (2009).
Id. at 117.
Id. at 117-20.
Id. at 120.
See Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 81, at 9 (describing an empirical
study that examines the role of qualified immunity in district court cases involving a variety of
197
198
199
200
201
202
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looks exclusively at qualified immunity in police excessive force cases. Because
it focuses on the relationship between qualified immunity, law enforcement,
and use of force, this study can help expand the literature by speaking
specifically to the relationship between qualified immunity and police
violence while demonstrating how the law actively produces unaccountability
in policing. The next Section provides greater detail on the research question
and methods used in our empirical study.
IV. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODS
A. Research Question
The understanding among scholars and jurists has largely been that the
doctrine of qualified immunity has shaped § 1983 excessive force claims ever
since the Court created it in 1967, with subsequent doctrinal clarifications
occurring over time.203 Our research sought to test this theory by looking
more closely at the development of qualified immunity as a defense for police
excessive force cases. Today, police commonly use qualified immunity to
evade constitutional tort claims, but little is known about the prevalence of
qualified immunity in excessive force claims over the past few decades. Has
qualified immunity been evenly asserted in police excessive force cases for as
long as it has been available as a defense?
B. Methods
To better understand the impact of the Supreme Court’s qualified
immunity decisions on district courts, we conducted an empirical study using
Westlaw to collect a sample of federal district court cases where the defendant
asserted qualified immunity. Our sample included cases from January 1,
1968—the year after Pierson v. Ray was decided—to December 31, 2019. To
collect only cases involving qualified immunity, we performed an advanced
search for all district court cases where the term “qualified immunity”
appeared at least five times in the court order. We then read each case to
determine if it involved an analysis by the court of whether a defendant was
entitled to qualified immunity, and only included cases where the court made
a substantive determination on this issue.

claims filed against state and local law enforcement defendants); Leong, supra note 160, at 684-85
(discussing the author’s empirical analysis of qualified immunity cases in federal district courts and
federal appellate courts); Nielson & Walker, supra note 160, at 27-30 (collecting prior empirical
studies of qualified immunity under Saucier and conducting analysis of qualified immunity cases
shortly after Pearson).
203 See sources cited supra notes 30–32 (surveying scholarly treatment of excessive force claims).

2022]

Plainly Incompetent

445

We divided the cases into three time periods. The first period spanned
1968-1982, the time after Pierson but before Harlow, when the original
subjective good-faith qualified immunity standard applied. The second
period spanned 1982-2001, the years after Harlow that established the modern
objective qualified immunity standard, but before Saucier, which established
that qualified immunity applied to excessive force claims. The third period
spanned 2001-2019, the post-Saucier years after the Supreme Court
definitively stated that qualified immunity applied to excessive force cases.
The first period only had sixty-nine total qualified immunity cases, so we
included all sixty-nine in our sample set. For the second and third time
periods, we used a random number generator to randomly select 250 qualified
immunity cases from our search results.204 In total, our sample included 569
cases.205 For all sampled cases, we recorded the underlying claim asserted by
the plaintiff. Then, out of the total number of cases in each of the three time
periods, we counted how many cases had excessive force by law enforcement
as an underlying claim.
Finally, we conducted an analysis of United States Supreme Court cases.
We performed a Westlaw search of all Supreme Court cases since April 12, 1967,
to collect all cases that involved qualified immunity as an issue presented to the
court. We then recorded the underlying claim asserted by the plaintiff in each
of those cases to determine both the proportion of qualified immunity cases
involving excessive force and the total number of qualified immunity cases.
V. FINDINGS
Our study of federal district court cases found that during the first period
of qualified immunity’s history, defendants asserted qualified immunity in a
variety of cases involving public officials, such as disputes concerning
employment discrimination, free speech rights, and seized property. For this
first period, it was incredibly rare for qualified immunity to come up in an
excessive force case. Fewer than three percent (2.9%, or 2/69) of all qualified
immunity cases involved police use of force.
But as the power of qualified immunity grew, so too do did the proportion
of qualified immunity cases involving excessive force. In 1982, the Court in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald expanded qualified immunity by creating the modern
204 The second time period produced 3,226 total search results and the third time period
produced “10,000+” total search results. The maximum number of cases that Westlaw can return in
a search is 10,000.
205 We set the parameters of the searches such that they included only cases before and after
the exact decision date of the relevant cases. The post-Harlow sample set pulled cases from June 25,
1982 to June 17, 2001. This search produced a total of 3,226 total search results. The post-Saucier
sample set pulled cases from June 19, 2001 to December 31, 2019 and produced “10,000+” total search
results. The maximum number of cases that Westlaw can return in a search is 10,000.
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“objective” qualified immunity test that courts use today.206 However, there
was no clarity about whether the test applied to excessive force cases because
the Court had not yet definitively stated whether qualified immunity applied
in this context. During this second period, from Harlow in 1982 to just before
Saucier in 2001, there was a steady increase in qualified immunity cases
involving excessive force. From 1981 to 2001, just under 15 percent (14.4% or
36/250) of all sampled qualified immunity cases involved excessive force.
In 2001 with Saucier v. Katz, the Court explicitly made qualified immunity
a part of excessive force doctrine.207 In the years after Saucier, the proportion
of qualified immunity cases involving excessive force jumped. During this
third period of qualified immunity’s history—from 2001 to 2019, after the
Saucier Court affirmed that qualified immunity could shield officers from
liability for excessive force—nearly one-third of all sampled qualified
immunity cases (31.2%, or 78/250) involved police excessive force. This means
that the portion of qualified immunity cases involving excessive force more
than doubled after the Court’s 2001 decision in Saucier. Excessive force was
also the most common underlying claim in our sample of cases post-Saucier.
The next most common claims in qualified immunity cases were employment
law claims (10%, or 25/250), Fourth Amendment unconstitutional search
claims (24/250, or 9.6%), and First Amendment claims (7.2%, or 18/250).208
The percentage of qualified immunity cases involving excessive force as well
as the raw numbers of total qualified immunity cases involving excessive force
are outlined in Table 1 and Figures 1-2. The full breakdown of post-Saucier
cases by case type is also reported in the pie chart at Figure 3 below.

See supra Section II.B.
See infra subsection VI.A.3.
Employment claims include claims for employment discrimination, unlawful retaliation,
and other wrongful termination claims. Fourth Amendment unlawful search claims include all
Fourth Amendment claims involving allegations of searches without a proper warrant or sufficient
cause. The breakdown of other represented claims are as follows: false arrest, wrongful arrest, and
false imprisonment claims (12/250); claims involving parental rights (e.g., due process claims
brought by parents arising from removal of a child from parental custody, abuses to children in state
custody, and termination of parental rights) (12/250); claims brought by imprisoned persons
regarding prison conditions (11/250); claims against health care providers for failure to provide
medical treatment or providing injurious medical treatment (9/250); claims involving education and
school conditions (7/250); various equal protection clause claims (excluding employment
discrimination claims) (6/250); and claims regarding privacy rights (6/250). “Various claims”
(42/250) includes the remainder of cases in the sample: procedural due process claims (5/250);
termination of state contracts, licenses, and permits (4/250); malicious prosecution (4/250); due
process property deprivation (4/250); wrongful death (3/250); Eighth Amendment claims (excluding
those involving prison conditions) (3/250); and disability rights (3/250).
206
207
208
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Table 1: Number of District Court Qualified Immunity Cases Involving
Excessive Force Claims

Time
Period

Total
Number of
Qualified
Immunity
Cases in
Database
69

Pierson–
Harlow
(1968–1982)
Harlow–

Saucier

(1982–2001)
Saucier–
present
(2001–2019)

Number
Sampled

Number
Involving
Excessive
Force

Percent
(%)

69

2

2.89%

3,226

250

36

14.4%

10,000+

250

78

31.2%

3%

14%

31%

Figure 1: Percent of District Court Qualified Immunity Cases Involving
Excessive Force Claims

PIERSON - HARLOW
(1967-1982)

HARLOW - SAUCIER
(1982-2001)

SAUCIER - PRESENT
(2001 - 2019)

Percent of Qualifed Immunity District Court Cases Involving Excessive Force
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2

36

78

Figure 2: Number of District Court Qualified Immunity Cases Involving
Excessive Force claims from Sample

PIERSON - HARLOW
(1967 - 1982)

HARLOW - SAUCIER
(1982 - 2001)

SAUCIER - PRESENT
(2001 - 2019)

Number of Qualifed Immunity Cases Involving Excessive Force

Figure 3: Post-Saucier: Qualified Immunity Cases by Case Type

In addition to an increase in the portion of qualified immunity cases
involving excessive force, our data shows a substantial increase in the total
number of qualified immunity cases after the Court modernized the doctrine
in Harlow and after the Court decided that qualified immunity could apply
to excessive force in Saucier. For the fifteen years when the Pierson “good
faith” approach applied, there were only sixty-nine qualified immunity cases

2022]

449

Plainly Incompetent

in our database. There was an enormous jump in the number of qualified
immunity cases for the second period, with 3,226 cases in the database for the
nineteen years after Harlow and before Saucier. And in the third period, the
number of qualified immunity cases in the database substantially increased
again, with over 10,000209 cases in the database in the eighteen years after
Saucier was decided in 2001.
Figure 4: Number of Qualified Immunity Cases
12000

10,000

10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0

3,226
69
Piersion - Harlow (19671982)

Harlow - Saucier (1982 2001)

Saucier - 2019

Number of Qualifed Immunity Cases

In the years after Saucier, cases involving both qualified immunity and
excessive force also became more prevalent at the Supreme Court. Before
Saucier, when qualified immunity came to the Court, it was in cases with a
variety of underlying facts and claims. But after Saucier, excessive force
became more closely entangled with qualified immunity and the question of
“clearly established law.” As our analysis illustrates, there was a significant
increase in the number of cases where the Supreme Court applied the qualified
immunity standard after 2001, and in over a third of these cases (11/30),
qualified immunity came to the Court through an excessive force case.210
209 The maximum number of cases that Westlaw can return in a search is 10,000. For this
search, Westlaw returned “10,000+” cases.
210 This data includes cases where the Court specifically applied the qualified immunity
standard to determine whether an official was properly granted or denied qualified immunity.
Omitted from this count are cases about procedural issues related to qualified immunity, see, e.g.,
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305-09 (1996) where the Court analyzed whether qualified immunity
decisions are appealable final decisions, cases about judicial and prosecutorial immunity, see, e.g.,
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) where the Court discussed judicial immunity and Kalina v. Fletcher,
522 U.S. 118 (1997) where the Court analyzed prosecutorial immunity, cases about what type of
immunity applies to specific types of defendants, see, e.g., Cleavings v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 194 (1985)
for a discussion regarding absolute versus qualified immunity for prison disciplinary committees,
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Table 2: Supreme Court Cases Applying the
Qualified Immunity Standard
Time Period

Harlow–Saucier

Supreme Court
Qualified
Immunity
Cases

Supreme Court
Qualified Immunity
Cases Involving
Excessive Force

Percent
(%)

10

1

10%

30

11

36.7%

(1982–2001)

Post-Saucier–
Present (1982–
2021)

The standard assumption is that qualified immunity has been available for
and used by police accused of using excessive force since its introduction to §
1983 litigation. But our empirical examination of qualified immunity cases
shows a much more nuanced pattern where, over time, qualified immunity
largely morphed into a specific theory of police use of force. In other words,
qualified immunity shifted from its origins as an idea to protect a wide range
of public officials facing liability for various types of actions to a doctrine
used disproportionately to protect police from civil lawsuits and the
possibility of paying damages when excessive force is alleged.
These results demonstrate that while qualified immunity is a central issue
in most excessive force cases today, it was not until the Court’s 2001 decision
in Saucier v. Katz that this relationship between qualified immunity and
excessive force took shape. This framing helps us understand the political
nature of qualified immunity and provides context for understanding various
police reform efforts. This data suggests that there is a “middle history” of
qualified immunity—a series of cases that led excessive force claims to
increasingly be met with a qualified immunity defense—that needs to be
further explored.
VI. DISCUSSION
Our empirical analyses reveal that qualified immunity’s strong connection
to police use of force emerged relatively recently. And it has not been as
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 169-70 (1992) where the Court held that there was no immunity available
to private defendants, and cases where qualified immunity is part of the procedural history of a case
but was not addressed by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327-28 (1986)
for an example where the Court declined to review a qualified immunity ruling.
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central to law enforcement defense strategies in excessive force cases for the
length of time that qualified immunity has been available. Indeed, qualified
immunity shifted from its origins as an idea to protect executive and judicial
officials to a theory that has, in large part, been used as a defense by police
officers. In this Part, we explain the process by which qualified immunity
became naturalized in excessive force law, i.e., how it came to be thought of
as a fundamental part of constitutional tort litigation. We will first tell the
story of the “middle history” of cases that produced this outcome, and then
focus on court cases that demonstrate the impact of qualified immunity’s
hollowing effect on Fourth Amendment law.
A. Uncovering the “Middle History” of Qualified Immunity
Greater attention needs to be paid to the specific doctrinal choices the
Supreme Court made in its qualified immunity jurisprudence in the years
after Harlow that led it to become closely connected to police use of force. A
middle history of qualified immunity at the Supreme Court, spanning from
1982 to 2001, is responsible for this development. To better understand this
middle history, we first provide a synthesis of the key jurisprudential shifts
during these years, and then in the subsections that follow, provide a detailed
discussion of each case.
Three years after Harlow, the Supreme Court decided Tennessee v. Garner,
the seminal excessive force case that reiterated the propositions that (a) the use
of deadly force constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure and (b) that the use of
deadly force on a fleeing unarmed person violates their constitutional rights.211
In the two years after Garner, the Supreme Court decided two cases that
were critical to the development of qualified immunity for police officers.
These cases—Malley v. Briggs and Anderson v. Creighton—involved police
asserting qualified immunity in the context of invalid arrest warrants and
illegal searches, not excessive force.212 But because the conduct of the police
in these cases was, as in excessive force cases post-Graham, analyzed under a

211 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“Where the suspect poses no immediate threat
to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not
justify the use of deadly force to do so. . . . The Tennessee statute is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes the use of deadly force against such fleeing suspects.”).
212 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 337 (1986) (“This case presents the question of the degree
of immunity accorded a defendant police officer . . . when it is alleged that the officer caused the
plaintiffs to be unconstitutionally arrested by presenting a judge with a complaint and a supporting
affidavit which failed to establish probable cause.”); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 636-37
(1987) (“The question presented is whether a federal law enforcement officer who participates in a
search that violates the Fourth Amendment may be held personally liable for money damages . . . .”).
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Fourth Amendment standard defined by notions of reasonableness,213 these
cases would later provide the basis for the Court’s decision to extend qualified
immunity to excessive force.214
Malley involved the first application of the new modern qualified
immunity standard from Harlow to the police.215 And then the Court in
Anderson, reviewing a Bivens claim, held that the reasonableness standards for
Fourth Amendment searches and qualified immunity are in fact different
standards. The first standard (the Fourth Amendment prohibition on
unreasonable searches) asks whether the defendant’s actions violated the
constitutional standards governing searches, while the second standard (the
Harlow objective reasonableness standard) asks whether it was clearly
established that the defendant’s actions violated the constitutional standards.216
Put differently, an officer could have a reasonable (under the qualified
immunity test) but mistaken (under the constitutional standards governing
searches) belief that he conducted a legal search. The distinction the Court
created here between the reasonableness of the search itself and the
reasonableness of the officer’s belief about the legality of the search made it
possible for qualified immunity to apply in the Fourth Amendment context.
In extending modern qualified immunity to police in these cases, the Court
had to introduce new policy judgements about how to balance the need for
police discretion with police accountability under § 1983. These cases
demonstrate an expansion of the Court’s decision to use qualified immunity
to supplant § 1983 and the Constitution with its own judgements about the
need to protect police from the burdens of litigation.
In 1989, the Court decided Graham v. Connor, which firmly rooted
excessive force cases in the Fourth Amendment and confirmed that the
213 See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643 (“[Plaintiffs] argue that it is inappropriate to give officials
alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment—and thus necessarily to have unreasonably searched
or seized—the protection of a qualified immunity intended only to protect reasonable official action.
It is not possible, that is, to say that one ‘reasonably’ acted unreasonably.”). The Court discussed the
relationship between the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and the
qualified immunity objective reasonableness standard. Id. at 643-44.
214 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 203 (2001) (rejecting argument that qualified immunity
should not apply to excessive force cases on the following grounds: “In Anderson, a warrantless search
case, we rejected the argument that there is no distinction between the reasonableness standard for
warrantless searches and the qualified immunity inquiry. We acknowledged there was some ‘surface
appeal’ to the argument that, because the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee was a right to be free from
‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures, it would be inconsistent to conclude that an officer who acted
unreasonably under the constitutional standard nevertheless was entitled to immunity because he
‘reasonably’ acted unreasonably.”), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2008).
215 See Malley, 457 U.S. at 339. A prior case had, however, applied the Harlow standard to the
U.S. Attorney General. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985); see also Baude, Is Qualified
Immunity Unlawful?, supra note 30, at 88-90 (charting all post-Harlow qualified immunity cases by
defendant and constitutional claim).
216 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638-41.
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objective reasonableness test guided these cases.217 Graham did not involve
the police asserting qualified immunity. But with the Court’s decision in
Anderson establishing qualified immunity for police search and seizure cases,
some lower courts after Graham around this time began allowing qualified
immunity for excessive force claims.218 A majority of circuits, however, did
not allow police in excessive force cases to assert qualified immunity.219 The
decision to exclude qualified immunity from excessive force made sense to
most circuit courts because the question of excessive force—under Graham—
and the question of qualified immunity—under Harlow—both turned on
whether the officer acted reasonably under the circumstances. As one circuit
court put it at the time: “the substantive inquiry that decides whether the
force exerted by police was so excessive that it violated the Fourth
Amendment is the same inquiry that decides whether the qualified immunity
defense is available to the government actor.”220 For almost twelve years after
Graham, a split continued in circuit courts about whether § 1983 excessive
force claims could be trumped by qualified immunity, with most courts
concluding that it could not.221
In 2001, the Supreme Court decided to weigh in on the question of
excessive force and qualified immunity for the first time in Saucier v. Katz.
This case put the question of whether police officers could evade liability
when they use unconstitutional force squarely before the court. Faced with
that decision, a majority of the Court made a particular doctrinal choice to
expand qualified immunity to excessive force, building primarily on the
policy arguments about the virtues of qualified immunity it had developed in
earlier cases.222 Critically, however, three justices—Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
217 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (“Today we make explicit what was implicit
in Garner’s analysis, and hold that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—
deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should
be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a
‘substantive due process’ approach.”).
218 Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 215 (4th Cir. 1991) (“There is no principled reason not to allow
a defense of qualified immunity in an excessive use of force claim . . . .”); Brown v. Glossip, 878 F.2d
871, 873 (5th Cir. 1989) (“We can discern no principled distinction between the availability of qualified
immunity as a defense to unreasonable searches . . . under the [F]ourth [A]mendment and as a defense
to an excessive force claim also grounded in the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”); Gold v. City of Miami, 121
F.3d 1442, 1446 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“Use of force must be judged on a case-by-case basis.
Because of this lack of a bright-line standard, qualified immunity applies unless application of the
[excessive force] standard would inevitably lead a reasonable officer in the defendant’s position to
conclude that the force was unlawful.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
219 See cases cited supra note 32.
220 Quezada v. County of Bernalillo, 944 F.2d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 1991).
221 See cases cited supra notes 32 & 218.
222 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205-06 (2001) (“[P]olice officers are often forced to make
split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation . . . . The concern of the immunity inquiry
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and Stevens—all disagreed with the majority’s decision to allow qualified
immunity in § 1983 excessive force cases, writing that “an officer whose
conduct is objectively unreasonable under Graham should find no shelter
under a sequential qualified immunity test.”223
With this general trajectory of the middle history of qualified immunity in
mind, this Section offers a more detailed account of the key decisions that opened
the door for qualified immunity to become a part of excessive force doctrine.
1. Qualified Immunity Applied to Fourth Amendment Searches: Malley v.
Briggs and Anderson v. Creighton
In the initial years after Harlow,1982 to 1986, lower courts often precluded
qualified immunity in cases that involved well-established Fourth
Amendment rights.224 Under Harlow, successfully overcoming a qualifiedimmunity defense only required plaintiffs to show that a clearly established
legal principle governed the case.225 The lack of clear factual precedent—
which the court would later require for qualified immunity—was irrelevant
to the inquiry at this moment. In 1986, the Supreme Court heard its first
cases regarding the Harlow qualified immunity standard in relation to Fourth
Amendment claims regarding invalid searches and false arrests.226 These
claims were somewhat analogous to qualified immunity’s origins in Pierson as
they involved police relying on seemingly valid but later invalidated
information as the basis for a search or arrest.227
is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular
police conduct. It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine,
here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts. An officer might
correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to whether a
particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances. . . . Qualified immunity operates . . . to
protect officers from the sometimes hazy border between excessive and acceptable force . . . .”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223 (2008).
223 Id. at 214 (Ginsburg, J. concurring). The justices noted that “the determination of police
misconduct in excessive force cases and the availability of qualified immunity both hinge on the same
question: Taking into account the particular circumstances confronting the defendant officer, could a
reasonable officer, identically situated, have believed the force employed was lawful?” Id. at 210.
224 See, e.g., Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1569 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the arresting
officers’ subjective beliefs of the reasonableness of their actions are no basis for immunity in light
of established legal principles); Creamer v. Porter, 754 F.2d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The defense
of qualified immunity is no longer to be evaluated with reference to any subjective consideration of
an officer’s good faith in carrying out certain discretionary functions.”); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d
1, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“We consider irrelevant to this inquiry defendants’ assertions that the
evidence does not support those allegations . . . .”).
225 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982).
226 See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 338-40 (1986); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
636-38 (1987).
227 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 550-551 (1967).
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Importantly, at this point, the Supreme Court had not decided any cases
about qualified immunity in the context of police excessive force. And there
was no consensus on the issue in lower federal courts. Some courts believed
that qualified immunity did not apply because the law clearly established that
use of excessive force violated the Fourth Amendment, and because the
immunity analysis collapsed into the excessive force inquiry since both
inquiries looked to the reasonableness of the police officer’s actions.228 Other
courts, however, believed that officers could be entitled to qualified immunity
in cases where the officer “reasonably, but mistakenly” believed that a
reasonable amount of force was used under the circumstances.229 Other

228 See, e.g., Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 1988) (“We hold therefore under
these circumstances that [Appellant] cannot claim immunity on the basis of his claimed ignorance
about constitutional rights of fleeing felons . . . .”); Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1217 (1st
Cir. 1986) (“The question before us is whether this constitutional violation was clearly established
. . . . We think that it was.”); Vizbaras v. Prieber, 761 F.2d 1013, 1018-19 (4th Cir. 1985) (Winter J.,
concurring and dissenting) (“[W]e have consistently read Harlow as eliminating the subjective
element from the defense, and we have focused instead on whether the challenged conduct violated
clearly established rights.”); Clark v. Beville, 730 F.2d 739, 740 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The issues presented
to the jury in this case were whether a reasonable officer under similar circumstances would have
had probable cause to believe that [Appellant] committed the offense of disorderly conduct and
whether the degree of force used in relationship to the need presented was reasonable under the
circumstances.” (citations omitted)); Stanulonis v. Marzec, 649 F. Supp. 1536, 1545 (D. Conn. 1986)
(“Here, [the officer’s] movement of his vehicle . . . could be found to constitute unreasonable force
in the attempt to apprehend plaintiff. That conduct, if proven as claimed, could constitute a violation
of plaintiff ’s Fourth Amendment rights.”); Skevofilax v. Quigley, 586 F. Supp. 532, 545 (D.N.J. 1984)
(“If plaintiffs prove that defendants arrested and imprisoned them without any basis in law, then
those defendants shown to have taken part in the wrongful conduct will clearly be without immunity
for their actions.”); cf. Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1370 (8th Cir. 1985) (describing that qualified
immunity was raised as to warrantless arrest claim, but not as to an excessive force claim).
229 See, e.g., Whitt v. Smith, 832 F.2d 451, 452-54 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[I]t is inevitable that law
enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is
present . . . we have indicated that in such cases those officials—like other officials who act in ways
they reasonably believe to be lawful—should not be held personally liable.”); White v. Pierce County,
797 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The deputies could have reasonably believed the force used to
subdue [plaintiff] was necessary for their immediate safety.”); Acoff v. Abston , 762 F.2d 1543, 154850 (11th Cir. 1985) (“A reasonable person at the time of the shooting incident might have read the
relevant appellate decisions . . . and still have concluded that a policy allowing the use of deadly
force to arrest a person for a serious felony was constitutional.” (citations omitted)); Varela v. Jones,
746 F.2d 1413, 1418 (10th Cir. 1984) (“[P]olice officers are not civilly liable if they act upon a
reasonable belief that the amount of force they used is reasonable under the circumstances.”); Bauer
v. Norris, 713 F.2d 408, 411 (8th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he court generally instructed the jury on appellant’s
defense of qualified immunity for official actions taken in good faith.”); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d at 1339, 1347 (2d Cir. 1972) (“At common
law the police officer always had available to him the defense of good faith and probable cause, and
this has been consistently read as meaning good faith and ‘reasonable belief ’ in the validity of the
arrest or search.”); cf. Bibbo v. Mulhern, 621 F. Supp. 1018, 1027 (D. Mass. 1985) (“[T]his is not a
case where summary judgment would be appropriate on the grounds of good faith immunity.”).
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courts, were less certain, finding that qualified immunity might be a defense
in some contexts.230
Meanwhile, at the Supreme Court, the first case to apply the modern
Harlow qualified immunity standard to police was Malley v. Briggs, which
involved an officer seeking an arrest warrant based on information gained from
a wiretap.231 The officer received a signed warrant from a judge, but a court
later determined that the application for the warrant failed to establish
probable cause, thereby invalidating the warrant.232 The arrested defendants
sued the police under § 1983 for violating their rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments in applying for the warrant.233 The police argued
that they were entitled to absolute, rather than qualified, immunity because
they were acting like an informant or prosecutor in the investigation.234
The court disagreed and held that the Harlow standard applied.235 It did
so in part because it had previously held in United States v. Leon that an
objective reasonableness standard applied in the context of a suppression
hearing on whether the exclusionary rule barred evidence obtained by a
signed but later invalidated warrant.236 Leon had relied on Harlow, setting the
ground for Harlow to apply in the Fourth Amendment search context for §
1983 claims.237 Although the Malley Court ultimately decided to apply the
standards from Leon about the exclusionary rule to the context of § 1983
constitutional tort liability, the Court did recognize the heightened dangers
of immunity in the context of § 1983 claims against police. The Court wrote:
[A] damages remedy for an arrest following an objectively unreasonable
request for a warrant imposes a cost directly on the officer responsible for the
unreasonable request, without the side effect of hampering a criminal
prosecution. Also, in the case of the § 1983 action, the likelihood is obviously
230 See, e.g., Heath v. Henning, 854 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[W]hile an instruction on state
law is a necessary part of a charge on the affirmative defense of qualified good faith immunity, it is
unnecessary when considering section 1983 liability.”); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 869 n.7 (4th
Cir. 1988) (“Once it is established that a [F]ourth [A]mendment violation has in fact occurred, the
officer’s objective ‘good faith’ may . . . become relevant . . . to the availability of the qualified
immunity defense . . . .” (citations omitted)); Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir.
1986) (1987) (“[W]e see no basis on which to disturb the jury’s liability verdict against the Officers
on the § 1983 claim.”); Vizbaras, 761 F.2d at 1016 (“[W]e hold that the district court did not err in
instructing the jury on the good faith immunity defense.”); Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1164
n.2 (5th Cir. 1986) (leaving open the question whether qualified immunity is a defense to
constitutional claims based on negligence).
231 475 U.S. 335, 338-40 (1986).
232 Id. at 337-39.
233 Id. at 338-39.
234 Id. at 341-42.
235 Id. at 344-45.
236 468 U.S. 897, 919 n.20 (1984).
237 Id. at 922.
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greater than at the suppression hearing that the remedy is benefiting the
victim of police misconduct one would think most deserving of a remedy—
the person who in fact has done no wrong, and has been arrested for no
reason, or a bad reason.238

But at the same time, dicta from the Court’s decision in Malley
demonstrates how the Court began to envision a much more powerful version
of qualified immunity for police than it had ever before. The Court wrote,
“As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection
to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”239
This line would later be cited in numerous Supreme Court decisions granting
qualified immunity to police officers for excessive force.240
One year after Malley, the Court took up a second Fourth Amendment
search case that set the foundation for the Court’s later decisions regarding
qualified immunity as a defense to excessive force claims. In Anderson v.
Creighton, the FBI conducted a warrantless search, and the question of
whether the FBI agents violated the Constitution turned on whether their
search was reasonable.241 The plaintiffs in the case argued that it was
nonsensical to allow the FBI agents to assert qualified immunity because the
agents had failed to show probable cause and exigent circumstances, which
meant that the search was by definition unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.242 The plaintiffs argued that “it is inappropriate to give officials
alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment—and thus necessarily to
have unreasonably searched or seized—the protection of a qualified immunity
intended only to protect reasonable official action.”243 Put differently, “It is not
possible . . . to say that one ‘reasonably’ acted unreasonably.”244
The Court, however, disagreed. Even though the Fourth Amendment
specifically uses the term “unreasonable” to set restrictions on searches and
seizures, the Court held that an officer’s conduct could violate the Fourth
Amendment rules governing searches yet still be objectively reasonably for
qualified immunity purposes.245 According to the Court, the reasonableness
standards for the Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity are subject to
Malley, 475 U.S. at 344.
Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (“In other words, immunity protects ‘all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 S. Ct. 7, 12
(2015) (per curiam) (“Put simply, qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.’”).
241 483 U.S. 635, 636-37 (1987).
242 Id. at 640-41, 643.
243 Id. at 643.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 643-44.
238
239
240
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separate analyses.246 The court also said that the argument that it was not
possible to say an officer “reasonably acted unreasonably” was “foreclosed by
the fact that this Court has previously extended qualified immunity to
officials who were alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment,” citing
the decision in Malley.247
The case also offered greater impunity for police. Specifically, it included
policy judgements in the qualified immunity analysis about the dangers and
hard decisions in police work and the need to protect police. As Justice Scalia
wrote in the majority opinion:
[R]egardless of the terminology used, the precise content of most of the
Constitution’s civil-liberties guarantees rests upon an assessment of what
accommodation between governmental need and individual freedom is
reasonable, so that the [the plaintiff ’s] objection, if it has any substance,
applies to the application of Harlow generally. We have frequently observed,
and our many cases on the point amply demonstrate, the difficulty of
determining whether particular searches or seizures comport with the Fourth
Amendment. Law enforcement officers whose judgments in making these
difficult determinations are objectively legally reasonable should no more be
held personally liable in damages than should officials making analogous
determinations in other areas of law.248

In the Court’s view, because police often made determinations about
probable cause with considerable uncertainty as to whether the search
comported with the Fourth Amendment, they should be held liable only if
their conduct was clearly forbidden.249
The Anderson opinion also predicted a future interpretation problem with
the “reasonableness” standard in qualified immunity that would become
central to the Court’s later refinement of the doctrine: that the test of
“objective legal reasonableness” depends “upon the level of generality at
which the relevant ‘legal rule’ is to be identified.”250 The Court directed lower
courts to analyze questions of clearly established law by looking to specific
rules rather than general rights, setting the stage for qualified immunity to
become a high bar for plaintiffs to overcome. The Court noted that “the right
the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in
a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the

246
247
248
249
250

See id.
Id. at 643 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986)).
Id. at 644 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
See id. at 644-46.
Id. at 639.
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right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right.”251
The Court’s ultimate formulation of the qualified immunity rule for police
officers in Fourth Amendment search cases was that an officer has qualified
immunity from civil lawsuits if the actions that the officer took “could
reasonably have been thought consistent” with the allegedly violated rights.252
And here, because a reasonable officer could have believed that the defendant
officer’s actions were legal, he was entitled to qualified immunity.253 Anderson
thus made qualified immunity more defendant-friendly by adding a new basis
for qualified immunity: an officer is immune from Fourth Amendment
liability for a warrantless search if a reasonable officer could have believed
that the conduct was lawful.254 This holding set the groundwork for thinking
about the “reasonableness” standards for the Fourth Amendment and for
qualified immunity as separate and distinct frameworks. This would later
become the key issue in determining whether or not qualified immunity could
apply to excessive force claims. By solidifying modern qualified immunity’s
role as a doctrine that protects police from Fourth Amendment claims,
Anderson represents a key transformation of the doctrine and the beginning
of the substantive redefinition of Fourth Amendment principles to allow
police to use force with greater impunity.
2. Qualified Immunity Meets Graham: 1989–2001
The Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Graham v. Connor established the
modern constitutional landscape for police excessive force claims.255 Prior to
this decision, plaintiffs brought suit against police officers for using excessive
force through different constitutional and statutory claims, such as substantive
due process and § 1983 as a standalone cause of action.256 In Graham, the Court
held that all claims concerning police use of force should be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard.257 Graham refined
the “objective reasonableness” test, holding that the reasonableness of an
officer’s use of force should be “judged from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”258 While
Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
Id. at 638.
On remand, the trial court held that “[a]n officer knowing what Anderson did could
reasonably have concluded that there was probable cause.” Creighton v. Anderson, 724 F. Supp. 654,
661 (D. Minn. 1989), aff ’d, 922 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1990).
254 See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 635.
255 See generally 490 U.S. 386, (1989).
256 See generally Obasogie & Newman, The Futile Fourth Amendment, supra note 60.
257 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
258 Id. at 396.
251
252
253
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some initially thought that this decision might bring clarity and simplicity to
understanding which standards applied in these type of cases, the Graham
decision ultimately made things more ambiguous by eschewing any bright-line
rules that might actually restrict police use of force in favor of a hazy notion of
“reasonableness” that remains undefined and has shown to be quite deferential
to police perspectives.259 The Court justified this approach by appealing to the
need to give officers wide latitude to make decisions about force.260 The test
eliminated other frameworks for assessing whether an instance of police use of
force violated the Constitution. In doing so, it solidified the Fourth
Amendment “objective reasonableness” standard as the only tool for doctrinal
assessment of these situations.261 Graham allowed the court to avoid creating
any specific rules that might guide officers in using force, and effectively got
the Court out of the business of making any real decisions on what constitutes
unconstitutional use of force for years to come.262
Graham was decided after Anderson—the case holding that qualified
immunity covers Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims and that
reasonableness for qualified immunity was different from reasonableness for
Fourth Amendment purposes.263 Yet, Graham expressly left open questions
about whether qualified immunity might apply to § 1983 cases where police are
alleged to have used force in a manner that violates the Fourth Amendment.264
Just as lower courts before Graham disagreed about whether qualified immunity
was a defense available to police for excessive force claims, courts in the decade
after Graham also disagreed about whether officers who use unreasonable force
may assert qualified immunity as a defense to § 1983 litigation.
Following the Graham decision, five circuit courts—including the Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits—held that the excessive force and
qualified immunity standards merged or were essentially the same in

259 See generally Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Endogenous Fourth Amendment:
An Empirical Assessment of How Police Understandings of Excessive Force Become Constitutional Law, 104
CORNELL L. REV. 1281 (2019) [hereinafter Obasogie & Newman, The Endogenous Fourth Amendment].
260 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (“[P]olice officers are often forced to make split-second
judgements—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of
force that is necessary in a particular situation.”).
261 See Obasogie & Newman, The Futile Fourth Amendment, supra note 60, at 1477-78. In the
Graham decision, the Court made a particular doctrinal choice in analyzing constitutional questions
regarding police violence under the Fourth Amendment—which has an individualizing effect—
instead of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause with its potential to allow groupbased and structural analysis—a move that did not reflect a preexisting trend or consensus in the
federal courts. The Court’s doctrinal choice in Graham has contributed to the perpetuation of police
excessive use of force in many communities of color. See generally id.
262 See id. at 1477-78.
263 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643-44 (1987).
264 Graham, 490 U.S. at 399 n.12.
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application in all but extraordinary cases.265 In a Tenth Circuit case on the
issue, the court explained its reasoning as follows:
While qualified immunity is a powerful defense in other contexts, in excessive
force cases the substantive inquiry that decides whether the force exerted by
police was so excessive that it violated the Fourth Amendment is the same
inquiry that decides whether the qualified immunity defense is available to
the government actor.266

A Sixth Circuit judge’s concurrence two years after Graham similarly
explained why qualified immunity would not typically apply in excessive
force cases:
This is not to say that qualified immunity will never be available under any
circumstances in excessive force cases; and in fact, the Supreme Court has
intimated that such a defense may in some instances be available. For the
most part, however, because an officer is equipped with all the knowledge he
needs regarding the use of excessive force, the only determination left to be
made is whether the conduct was excessive under the circumstances.267

Three circuits—the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh—concluded in the
aftermath of Graham that the test for qualified immunity differs from the
substantive test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.268 These
courts applied the rule from Anderson for unreasonable searches to excessive
force cases.
The First and Second Circuits landed in the middle.269 The First Circuit
thought that qualified immunity and excessive force standard are similar
inquiries, writing in one case: “In theory, substantive liability and qualified
immunity are two separate questions . . . . In police misconduct cases,
however, the Supreme Court has used the same ‘objectively reasonable’
standard in describing both the constitutional test of liability and the Court’s
own standard for qualified immunity.”270 But at the same time, the First
Circuit thought that if a reasonable officer could have believed that the
defendant officer’s force was justified and lawful, they were entitled to
qualified immunity under Anderson, regardless of whether there was a Fourth

See cases cited supra note 32.
Quezada v. County of Bernalillo, 944 F.2d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 1991).
Yates v. City of Cleveland, 941 F.2d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 1991) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
268 See cases cited supra note 218.
269 See, e.g., Finnegan v. Fountain, 915 F.2d 817, 823-24 (2d Cir. 1990); Roy v. Lewiston, 42
F.3d 691, 695 (1st Cir. 1994); Napier v. Town of Windham, 187 F.3d 177, 183 (1st Cir. 1999).
270 Roy, 42 F.3d at 695 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) and Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)).
265
266
267
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Amendment violation.271 The Second Circuit seemed to view qualified
immunity and excessive force as separate inquiries, but the rule it formulated
effectively merged the analysis.272 It said that even if an officer exerts
“constitutionally excessive force,” qualified immunity is appropriate unless it
“should have been apparent” that the “particular degree of force under the
particular circumstances was excessive.273
The division among the courts of appeals on whether the qualified
immunity inquiry is superfluous in Fourth Amendment excessive force cases
would lead the Supreme Court to take up the issue in 2001 in Saucier v. Katz.
3. The Supreme Court of the United States Decides Qualified Immunity
Applies to Excessive Force: Saucier v. Katz
After years of expanding qualified immunity in other areas, the Supreme
Court in Saucier v. Katz established the doctrinal framework we are familiar
with today: allowing police officers alleged to have used excessive force to
invoke qualified immunity as a defense to § 1983 claims.274 The question
presented before the Court in Saucier was whether the test for qualified
immunity is identical to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard
used to determine whether police use of force is lawful such that a finding of
unreasonable force necessarily precludes the officer from being entitled to
qualified immunity. The Saucier majority decided that the course chosen by
most appellate courts up to that point—using Graham as the guide for
excessive force and leaving qualified immunity out of the analysis—was
misguided.275 The Court created a second-layer objective reasonableness test
for qualified immunity, that would apply on top of the objective
reasonableness test used in Graham.276 Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens
all disagreed with this approach, finding qualified immunity duplicative of

271 Napier, 187 F.3d at 183 (citing Anderson to support the proposition that “police officers are
entitled to qualified immunity if reasonably well-trained officers confronted with similar
circumstances could reasonably believe their actions were lawful under clearly established law”).
272 See Finnegan, 915 F.2d at 823-24.
273 Id.
274 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 197 (2001) (“[T]he ruling on qualified immunity requires an
analysis not susceptible of fusion with the question whether unreasonable force was used in making
the arrest.”), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2008).
275 Id. at 203-07; see also cases cited supra notes 228–230 (discussing the circuit split among
lower courts).
276 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204-05 (“The inquiries for qualified immunity and excessive force
remain distinct, even after Graham. . . . The qualified immunity inquiry, on the other hand, has a
further dimension.”).
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Graham’s objective reasonableness test and therefore inappropriate for
excessive force claims.277
The underlying facts of Saucier involved an animal rights protester named
Elliot Katz who staged a demonstration at the celebration of a military base
in San Francisco where then-Vice-President Al Gore was speaking.278 Katz
attempted to display a banner, and several military police officers, including
the defendant officer Donald Saucier, grabbed Katz from behind and rushed
him out of the area.279 Officer Saucier took Katz to a military van and threw
him inside with a “gratuitously violent shove.”280 The police then drove Katz
to a military police station and released him.281
Katz filed a Bivens claim against the military police officers for violating
his constitutional rights.282 Katz alleged that the officers had used excessive
force during his arrest.283 The district court granted the defendant military
officers’ motions for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified
immunity for all officers except the excessive force claim against Saucier.284
The court argued that there was a factual dispute about whether Saucier had
used excessive force to remove Katz from the crowd and put him in the van.285
The lower court held that “the law governing excessive force claims was
clearly established at the time of the arrest, and that in the Fourth
Amendment context, the qualified immunity inquiry is the same as the
inquiry made on the merits.”286
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that
summary judgement based on qualified immunity would be an inappropriate
response to the excessive force claim against Saucier.287 It first concluded that the
law on excessive force was clearly established under Graham v. Connor’s objective
reasonableness test.288 It then found that the qualified immunity inquiry was
essentially the same as the constitutional inquiry, and as such, became redundant
277 Id. at 214 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[A]n officer who uses force that is objectively
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [him] simultaneously meets the
standard for qualified immunity, and the standard the Court set in Graham for a decision on the
merits in his favor. Conversely, an officer whose conduct is objectively unreasonable under Graham
should find no shelter under a sequential qualified immunity test.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
278 Id. at 197-98 (majority opinion).
279 Id. at 198.
280 Id. at 198, 208.
281 Id. at 198.
282 Id. at 198-99; see also cases cited supra note 87 and accompanying text.
283 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 197.
284 Id. at 199.
285 Id.
286 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
287 Id. at 199-200.
288 Id. at 199.
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when excessive force is alleged, because “both concern the objective
reasonableness of the officer’s conduct in light of the circumstances.”289
At the Supreme Court, Katz argued that the Ninth Circuit had correctly
concluded that the two reasonableness inquiries merge.290 Katz argued that
Graham’s standard on the merits provides the same protection for a law
enforcement officer as the protection under the doctrine of qualified
immunity because “the same facts are viewed from the same perspective (the
objectively reasonable officer) and assessed with an equivalent measure of
what level of force is legally excessive (‘reasonable’ and ‘reasonably known to
be reasonable’).”291
He also argued that qualified immunity did not make sense in the context
of excessive force. The Court had already struck a balance between providing
police officers with the ability to use discretion in executing their duties, while
preserving the right to a jury trial when there is a genuine issue of material
fact whether excessive force was used.292 Graham instructs the lower courts
that the threshold showing that an officer has not acted in an objectively
reasonable manner is a high one.293 Officers need not show that other options
were available; they need only show that their actions were reasonable from
their perspective at the time.294 Katz argued that following Graham, lower
courts applying the Graham standard to various factual circumstances had
found that the excessive force test provides officers with wide latitude to
determine the amount of force that is reasonably necessary.295 Therefore,
according to Katz, it did not make sense to apply qualified immunity in
excessive force cases because doing so would upend the decision the Court
made in Graham—a decision that already afforded broad constitutional
latitude to officers using force.296
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that qualified
immunity should not apply to excessive force claims under Graham.297 Instead,
Id. at 200.
Id. at 203-04.
Brief for Respondents, Saucier v. Katz, 553 U.S. 194 (2001) (No. 99-1977), 2001 WL 173527,
at *24 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent Katz].
292 Id. at *5-6; *17-19 (“Graham achieves this mixture of providing police officers the confidence
they need in order to do their difficult job, while preserving the right to a jury trial when there is a
genuine issue of material fact.”).
293 Id. at *8 (“Graham still provides a high threshold of protection for officers through jury
instructions.”); see also Saucier 533 U.S. at 205.
294 Brief for Respondent Katz, supra note 291, at *5-6 (“It is not enough to show that using
20/20 hindsight the officer could have made a better choice.”); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204-05
(explaining that claims should be evaluated under the “objective reasonableness standard” and that
the level of reasonableness of the officer’s belief should be judged as of the moment in question).
295 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204.
296 Brief for Respondent Katz, supra note 291, at *9-11.
297 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204-05, 207.
289
290
291
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the majority opinion added a second objective reasonableness inquiry to
Graham to determine if officers could have qualified immunity—even if they
were found to have used excessive force in violation of the Constitution.298
The decision split, with Justice Kennedy writing the majority opinion joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and
Souter, and with Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens,
writing a concurrence that argued qualified immunity should not apply.299
The majority opinion had two main parts. As noted in our discussion of
qualified immunity’s emergence,300 the first issue in the case was the proper
sequence of the two-step qualified immunity test. The Court created a new
rule that required lower courts to first engage the part of the qualified
immunity test that asks whether a constitutional right was violated on the
facts alleged before moving to the part of the test that asks whether the law
was clearly established.301 The Court held that if no constitutional right was
violated, courts need not inquire further into qualified immunity or questions
about clearly established law.302 The Court thought that by putting the
constitutional question first through this new rule, qualified immunity better
serves its intended purpose: disposing of weak claims early on in litigation.303
The Ninth Circuit decided the clearly established law question before the
constitutional violation question, which under this new rule was an error.304
The second issue in the decision, which has been largely overlooked in the
qualified immunity literature,305 was whether qualified immunity could apply
to excessive force cases at all.306 Before commenting on that question
specifically, the Court first addressed whether the Ninth Circuit correctly
conducted the clearly established law analysis.307 The Ninth Circuit had
concluded that the law on excessive force met the “clearly established”
standard.308 The Court of Appeals argued that Graham v. Connor clearly
established that federal courts determine whether force is excessive in
violation of the Fourth Amendment by asking whether the officer’s actions
were objectively reasonable under the circumstances, given the officer’s
Id. at 201.
Justice Souter wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Saucier, 553 U.S. at 196.
See supra Part II.
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
Id.
Id. at 200-02.
Id. at 200. Several years later, the Supreme Court would overturn this sequencing rule in
Pearson v. Callahan, letting courts decide which part of the test to do first. 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
305 See supra note 32 (listing court cases and legal scholarship arguing that qualified immunity
should not apply in police excessive force cases).
306 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 203-04.
307 Id. at 202.
308 Id. at 200.
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
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knowledge at the time.309 The Supreme Court, however, concluded that its
own Graham rule for excessive force was too general to provide any clearly
established law on excessive force.310 The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the
law was clearly established was an error because “the question whether the
right was clearly established must be considered on a more specific level than
recognized by the Court of Appeals.”311 Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy explained:
In this litigation, for instance, there is no doubt that Graham v. Connor
clearly establishes the general proposition that use of force is contrary to the
Fourth Amendment if it is excessive under objective standards of
reasonableness. Yet that is not enough. Rather, we emphasized in Anderson
“that the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly
established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.” The relevant, dispositive
inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it
would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted.312

The decision in Anderson—a case about Fourth Amendment searches—proved
critical to the Court’s analysis regarding the Fourth Amendment and police use of
force.313 Because the Court in Anderson decided to create an analytical distinction
between the reasonableness standards for warrantless searches and for qualified
immunity, the Saucier Court was able to similarly distinguish between
reasonableness for excessive force and for qualified immunity.314
But as Katz pointed out, Anderson came before Graham, and it did not
make sense to extend its analysis for probable cause to excessive force.315 Since
Graham came after Anderson, it presumably addressed the concerns stated in
Anderson. Katz argued in the respondents’ brief:
Both cases at their core seek to balance the concern that “actions for damages
may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional
guarantees,” with the concern that “permitting damages suits against
government officials can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that

Id. at 199, 204.
Id. at 202-03.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201-02 (citations omitted).
Id. at 203-04.
Id. at 204 (“The inquiries for qualified immunity and excessive force remain distinct, even
after Graham.”).
315 Brief of Respondent Katz, supra note 291, at *7.
309
310
311
312
313
314
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fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit
officials in the discharge of their duties.”316

Graham’s objective reasonableness standard for excessive force gave
officers latitude for making mistakes about what amount of force was
necessary.317 Because the test for excessive force already provided officers with
a protection sufficiently similar to qualified immunity, it would be a mistake
to add a separate immunity inquiry—and an additional hurdle for plaintiffs—
in excessive force cases.318 Katz also argued that Anderson was distinguishable
because Fourth Amendment search cases dealt with evolving precise legal
standards for probable cause; thus, officers operated with legal uncertainty
when conducting searches.319 In contrast, Graham’s single standard directing
officers to use objectively reasonable force under the circumstances governs
Fourth Amendment excessive force cases.320
The Court rejected these arguments about the relationship between
Anderson and Graham.321 It concluded that objective reasonableness under
Graham centered on whether the use of force was objectively reasonable given
the facts and the circumstances of the case.322 With respect to officers’
mistaken beliefs, this might mean that an officer could “reasonably but
mistakenly” think something about a situation such that a particular use of
force was thought to be necessary.323 Qualified immunity, however, involved
a different type of mistake. Rather than a mistake about the facts before an
officer, qualified immunity, according to the Court, was about when an officer
makes a reasonable mistake about whether the force used was legal.324
While Katz had argued that the ambiguous nature of the Graham
objective-reasonableness test made qualified immunity unnecessary by

Id. at *7 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)).
Id. at *7-8 (explaining that Graham gives officers “a high threshold of protection” prior to,
at, and after the summary judgment stage).
318 Id.
319 Id. at *27 (“[T]he Graham standard is well settled compared with probable cause, which is
often in a state of flux. . . . This is because the determination of probable cause involves the legal
standards for the underlying crime, which is often evolving. . . . Such legal uncertainty explains and
underscores the need for the qualified immunity doctrine in the area of probable cause. No such
developing legal doctrine exists in the area of the amount of force necessary to make an arrest.”).
320 Id. at *24-26.
321 Saucier v. Katz, 553 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (“Graham and Anderson refute the excessive
force/probable cause distinction on which much of respondent’s position seems to depend.”),
overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2008).
322 Id. at 205-06 (explaining that Graham directs courts to consider facts and circumstances
such as the severity of the crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest).
323 Id. at 205.
324 Id. at 205-06.
316
317
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granting officers wide latitude in making split-second decisions,325 the Court
found the ambiguity of the test provided a reason for allowing a separate
qualified immunity test. The Court explained:
It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal
doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer
confronts. An officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have
a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal
in those circumstances. If the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is
reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.
Graham does not always give a clear answer as to whether a particular
application of force will be deemed excessive by the courts. This is the nature
of a test which must accommodate limitless factual circumstances. This
reality serves to refute respondent’s claimed distinction between excessive
force and other Fourth Amendment contexts; in both spheres the law must
be elaborated from case to case. Qualified immunity operates in this case,
then, just as it does in others, to protect officers from the sometimes “hazy
border between excessive and acceptable force,” . . . and to ensure that before
they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful.326

Qualified immunity and excessive force, therefore, were distinct
inquiries—even after Graham. In addition to the deference officers receive via
the ambiguous Graham standard regarding the constitutionality of the
underlying excessive force claim, the Supreme Court’s view in Saucier is that
officers may also be entitled to qualified immunity in the event that they use
excessive force in violation of an individual’s rights if they somehow
reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.
In applying these new standards to the facts of the case in Saucier, the
majority decided to start by assuming that a constitutional violation could
have occurred, in order to move immediately to the issue of clearly established
law.327 It noted that the “general prohibition against excessive force was the
source for clearly established law that was contravened in the circumstances
this officer faced.”328 The Court identified the “gratuitously violent shove” as
the main source of the excessive force complaint, and concluded that neither
the Ninth Circuit nor Katz had cited any cases demonstrating a clearly
established rule prohibiting an officer from acting as Officer Saucier had,

325
326
327
328

See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
Saucier, 553 U.S. at 205-06 (quoting Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 207.
Id. at 207-08.
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emphasizing the urgency of protecting the Vice President at the event and
that the arrest did not injure Katz.329
Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Stevens
and Breyer, which disagreed with the decision to apply qualified immunity to
excessive force cases.330 The opinion was a concurrence because it agreed with
the outcome of the majority decision—granting summary judgment to the
officer—but on the grounds that the officer’s use of force was reasonable
under Graham, not on the grounds that the officer should have a qualified
immunity defense available to him.331
Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer first argued that qualified
immunity should not apply to excessive force because both used the same
objective reasonable test. They said that the majority opinion “tacks on to a
Graham inquiry a second, overlapping objective reasonableness inquiry”
because “the determination of police misconduct in excessive force cases and
the availability of qualified immunity both hinge on the same question:
Taking into account the particular circumstances confronting the defendant
officer, could a reasonable officer, identically situated, have believed the force
employed was lawful?” 332 The concurring opinion explained further:
[A]n officer who uses force that is objectively reasonable “in light of the facts
and circumstances confronting [him],” simultaneously meets the standard for
qualified immunity, and the standard the Court set in Graham for a decision
on the merits in his favor. Conversely, an officer whose conduct is objectively
unreasonable under Graham should find no shelter under a sequential
qualified immunity test.333

This means that, under the concurring opinion, it would be impossible for
an officer to violate the constitutional standards for excessive force under
Graham, yet still meet the standards for qualified immunity. As the Justices
wrote: “Once it has been determined that an officer violated the Fourth
Amendment by using ‘objectively unreasonable’ force as that term is
explained in Graham v. Connor, there is simply no work for a qualified
immunity inquiry to do.”334
*

329
330
331
332
333
334

*

*

Id. at 208-09.
Id. at 216-17 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 209-10.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 214 (citations omitted) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)).
Id. at 216-17.

470

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170: 407

The culmination of qualified immunity’s middle history in Saucier v. Katz
demonstrates that there was no natural or inevitable expansion of qualified
immunity into § 1983 excessive force doctrine. Rather, the conversation
among federal courts on whether qualified immunity should be available as a
defense in § 1983 litigation was remarkably uneven and contested. Prior to
2001, there was no Supreme Court doctrine establishing that police officers
sued for excessive force could invoke qualified immunity. Most circuits and
many legal scholars thought that it did not make sense to apply qualified
immunity to excessive force claims because both standards turn on whether
an officer reasonably believed that the use of force was necessary.335 Saucier
changed that. It established new defendant-friendly ground rules that would
govern all excessive force cases moving forward. And as our empirical
findings in Part III demonstrate, as the Court made the specific, disputed choice
to connect qualified immunity to cases that involve police use of force, lower
courts began to see for the first time an influx of excessive force cases where
defendants asserted qualified immunity. In the next Section, we look at the
concrete implications and effects of this decision to bring qualified immunity
into excessive force.
B. Middle History Implications
This Section examines the consequences of the Court’s choice to bring
qualified immunity into the realm of excessive force law. We first discuss how
this choice hollowed out the Fourth Amendment constitutional limits on
excessive force by allowing the question of “clearly established law” to
preempt the question of whether an instance of police use of force was
reasonable. We then talk about two more specific aspects of this shift that
work to undermine § 1983 excessive force claims. First qualified immunity
operates as a self-reinforcing doctrine while also allowing abstract legal
questions to overshadow victims’ experiences with police violence. Second,
after discussing how qualified immunity transformed federal courts’ approach
to § 1983 claims, we show the impact of this transformation on excessive force
cases at the Supreme Court. In the years after Saucier, the Court took up
eleven excessive force cases that implicated qualified immunity, all but two of
which were decided in favor of the police. 336
See sources cited supra note 32.
See cases cited supra note 79. The only cases where the Supreme Court did not rule in favor
of the police were Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam) and Tolan v. Cotton, 572
U.S. 650 (2014) (per curiam). The Supreme Court decided both cases on procedural grounds relating
to the way the district court interpreted the respective facts of the cases, not on substantive issues
of qualified immunity. Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2005-08 (vacating and remanding the appellate
court’s finding of qualified immunity due to its incorrect reliance on facts unknown to a border
335
336
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1. Legal Questions of “Clearly Established Law”
Replace Constitutional Law
Qualified immunity has allowed questions about “clearly established law”
to preempt constitutional questions about the reasonableness of particular
instances of police use of force.337 Cases where the police have allegedly used
excessive force traditionally focus on the constitutional question of whether
the officer’s use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. For example,
in Graham v. Connor—the case that is considered the foundation of modern
excessive force litigation—there was never any conversation about qualified
immunity or clearly established law at any stage in the litigation. The courts
at all stages in the case focused solely on the constitutional question of
whether the officer used excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.338 But under the modern qualified immunity rules today, an
officer’s ability to face civil suit for excessive force often does not depend on
that constitutional question. Instead, the ability to pursue civil liability turns
solely on the question of whether there is preexisting clearly established law
matching the particular facts of the case. The question of whether the officer
violated the Constitution by using unreasonable force is frequently not
addressed by the courts.

patrol agent at the time he shot the plaintiff); Tolan, 572 U.S. at 657 (“[T]he Fifth Circuit failed to
view the evidence at summary judgment in the light most favorable to Tolan . . . .”).
337 See e.g., City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2021) (per curiam) (“We need not, and
do not, decide whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment in the first place . . . . On this
record, the officers plainly did not violate any clearly established law.”); Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct.
1148, 1152 (2018) (“Here, the Court need not, and does not, decide whether Kisela violated the Fourth
Amendment when he used deadly force against Hughes. For even assuming a Fourth Amendment
violation occurred . . . Kisela was at least entitled to qualified immunity.”); Copson v. Hephner, No.
19-0127, 2021 WL 1202072, at *11 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 30, 2021) (“In this case, the court need not, and
does not, decide whether [the officers] violated the Fourth Amendment when [they] used deadly
force . . . because, even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, the officers were entitled
to qualified immunity.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Chavez v. Las Vegas
Metro. Police Dep't, No. 11-1445, 2014 WL 374444, at *6 (D. Nev. Feb. 3, 2014) (“[T]he Court
declines to reach the issue of whether [the officers] violated [the plaintiff ’s] Fourth Amendment
rights. . . . [The officers] are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity because the law is not
clearly established.”), aff'd, 648 F. App'x 657 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Wilson v. Prince George’s
County, 893 F.3d 213, 221 n.11 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Supreme Court precedent offers little guidance
regarding our determination whether the right at issue is clearly established because in many
instances, the Court has declined to decide whether an officer’s actions constituted a violation of the
Fourth Amendment and instead has considered whether the right recognized by a court of appeals
was clearly established”).
338 See 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Graham v. City of Charlotte, 827 F.2d 945, 949 (4th Cir. 1987);
Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 249 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 19, 1986). The Suprme Court
noted that “[s]ince no claim of qualified immunity has been raised in this case, . . . we express no
view on its proper application in excessive force cases that arise under the Fourth Amendment.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 399 n.12.
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As we discussed in Part I, qualified immunity has a preemption function
because of a specific doctrinal choice the Court made in Pearson v. Callahan.339
The test for modern qualified immunity consists of two questions: whether
the defendant infringed the plaintiff ’s constitutional right and whether the
constitutional infringement violated clearly established law.340 In Pearson, the
court held that lower courts could address the “clearly established law”
question first.341 If the court finds that the constitutional law that applies to
the facts of the case is not clearly established, the court can choose not to
address whether the defendant’s actions violated the Constitution.342 This
means for excessive force cases, the question of “clearly established law” can
come before the question of whether force is excessive. And critically, if a court
does determine that there is no clearly established law, it can stop the analysis
there.343 If there is no clearly established law, the defendant is automatically
entitled to qualified immunity.344 The issue of whether an officer used
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment is effectively moot.
This has several consequences, all of which entrench qualified immunity’s
disempowering effect on the constitutional limits on excessive force.
Qualified immunity becomes a self-reinforcing doctrine where “clearly
established law” preempts examination of underlying constitutional issues.
When a court determines there is no clearly established rule about a given
use of force, its analysis stops. And by not addressing the constitutionality of
the facts at hand, there will continue to be a lack of clearly established law on
the issue, creating a cycle of unaccountability.
Another way to think about this is in terms of the underdevelopment of
Fourth Amendment law. Qualified immunity gives courts the opportunity to
avoid deciding critical questions about what types of force are constitutional.
Without qualified immunity, courts faced with questions about novel
excessive force issues—such as use of the “prone position”—would always
have to decide whether or in what circumstances such force is permissible.
But qualified immunity allows courts to perpetually kick the can down the
proverbial road by simply saying there is no clearly established law on the
issue.345 A court’s decision to not address the constitutional question should
not be understood as merely reflecting the absence of a clearly established
policy. In fact, when a court chooses to grant qualified immunity to an officer
without giving any attention to the constitutional question of whether force
See supra Section II.C.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
345 See cases cited supra note 337.
339
340
341
342
343
344
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is excessive, it signals that the court is comfortable with maintaining a
particular legal environment: one without clear limits on police use of force
and where police are above the Fourth Amendment.
A close analysis of recent district court excessive force cases helps to make
more concrete these abstract arguments about what qualified immunity does
to the Fourth Amendment.
In a 2021 district court case in West Virginia, the court granted qualified
immunity to two police officers who shot and killed a man experiencing a
mental health crisis.346 The police had been called when the man, Kyle
Andrew Copson, had been spotted near a gas station “with a knife, . . .
agitated, walking back and forth.”347 Two police officers arrived and found
Copson “waving the knife and talking to himself.”348 Copson then walked into
the parking lot of a neighboring fast-food restaurant, where he “continued to
wave the knife and yell,” despite the officers’ orders to drop the weapon.349
Copson eventually “came toward” one of the officers with the knife, at which
point both officers fired shots at and killed Copson.350 There was evidence
that Copson “was suffering from the effects of his mental illnesses” on the
day of the shooting, although the police officers said they were unaware of
this at the time.351 He had a history of “paranoid schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder, anxiety, depression, and opioid addiction.”352
Copson’s family brought a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim
against the police officers.353 Yet, rather than analyzing whether Copson’s
constitutional rights had been violated, the district court skipped over this
issue and started its analysis with the second prong of the qualified immunity
analysis: whether the law in this area was clearly established.354
Copson’s family argued that a line of cases in the Fourth Circuit clearly
established that “mere possession” of a weapon does not justify deadly
force.355 The court said that those cases did not present clearly established law
on point because Copson was “waving that weapon in a public setting while
behaving erratically and refusing officers’ repeated commands to drop the
knife.”356 The family pointed specifically to one case from the Fourth Circuit
denying qualified immunity to an officer who responded to a call about a
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356

Copson v. Hephner, No: 1:19-00217, 2021 WL 1202072, at *1-2 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 30, 2021).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5, *9.
Id. at *9.
Id.
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suicidal man and shot him in his home as the man proceeded down his stairs
with a knife toward the officer while the officer directed him to drop the
knife.357 The district court distinguished this case too, on the ground that
Copson was in public, rather than at home waving the knife, and that the
officers did not know about Copson’s mental health history.358
There was no analysis of whether, in fact, Copson’s constitutional rights
had been violated when he was shot and killed by the officers.359 The court
decided that it “need not . . . decide whether [the officers] violated the Fourth
Amendment when [they] used deadly force against [Copson].”360 This
conclusion was largely supported by Kisela v. Hughes, a 2018 Supreme Court
case where the Court similarly granted qualified immunity to police officers
without answering the constitutional question concerning the reasonableness
of shooting a person with a knife.361 By focusing exclusively on the question
of clearly established law, the district court in Copson and the Supreme Court
in Kisela were able to pass over questions about police use of deadly force
against people who possess knives. Turning excessive force cases into debates
primarily about qualified immunity allows courts to analyze only a given
situations’ technical similarity to other case law, and to the reasonableness of
the officer’s use of deadly force.
A 2013 Florida district court case provides another example of how
qualified immunity permits courts to avoid drawing clear lines about when it
is permissible for police to shoot people. In Belizaire v. City of Miami, police
responded to a 911 call about a domestic dispute and confronted Gibson
Belizaire in response to the call.362 The officers alleged that Belizaire was
“suspected of having fired a gun” in their direction.363 Belizaire ran away from
the officers and hid in a vacant lot.364 He remained there for over an hour and
a half while officers, joined by canine units and a SWAT team, surrounded
the area.365 Officers neither warned Belizaire, nor asked him to drop any
Id. at *10 (citing Connor v. Thompson, 647 F. App’x 231 (4th Cir. 2016)).
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Id. In Kisela, the police responded to a report of a woman “acting erratically” and “hacking
at a tree with a large kitchen knife.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1151, 1153 (2018). The officers
arrived and saw Hughes “emerge from [a] house carrying a large knife at her side” and walk towards
another woman and stop “no more than six feet from her.” Id. at 1151. Officers directed Hughes to
drop the knife, “but she did not acknowledge the officers’ presence or drop the knife.” Id. One officer
fired four shots. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that it “need not . . . decide whether [the officer]
violated the Fourth Amendment when he used deadly force against Hughes” because the officer was
“at least entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at 1152.
362 944 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1207 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
363 Id.
364 Id.
365 Id.
357
358
359
360
361
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weapons, nor extended the opportunity to surrender.366 Rather, they fired 130
rounds at Belizaire and killed him.367
Belizaire’s family filed a § 1983 suit filed in response, and the court granted
qualified immunity for all of the officers.368 The family argued that Tennessee
v. Garner clearly established that it is unconstitutional to use deadly force
unless the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury
to the officer or others.369 The court said that Garner did not count as clearly
established law because Garner dealt with an “unarmed, fleeing suspect”
whereas here, the complaint “concedes that Belizaire was not fleeing at the
time of his death.”370 The family also pointed to two Eleventh Circuit cases
finding officers used excessive force when they shot unarmed individuals who
were not fleeing and “did not pose a threat.”371 In this case, the court said
Belizaire “may not have posed an immediate threat, [but] he did in fact pose
a threat” because he was believed to have been armed.372 The court said this
case was more like Penley v. Eslinger, a separate Eleventh Circuit case where
the police shot a fifteen-year-old boy who had brought a toy gun to school.373
In Penley, the boy was in the school bathroom with the toy gun when police
decided to have a sniper shoot him.374 That case was similar to the facts here,
the court said, because in both cases the officers believed that the person had
a gun.375 The court recognized the cases were, however, very different because
there were “no allegations here that Mr. Belizaire presented an immediate
threat to anyone once he reached the vacant lot” and “no allegations that he
ever displayed his weapon or attempted to fire back at the police
perimeter.”376 Nonetheless, the court said that there was a “nebulous state of
the law” which countered the assertion that the officers violated a clearly
established right, and that this case fell into the “hazy border between
excessive and acceptable force.”377
These cases demonstrate how the decision to apply qualified immunity to
§ 1983 excessive force claims has led lower courts to only ask questions about
clearly established law when they analyze cases about the use of force.
Qualified immunity allows courts to avoid addressing constitutional
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1207-08, 1211.
Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1211-12.
Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1212.
Id. (citing Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 845 (11th Cir. 2010)).
Id.; Penley, 605 F.3d at 846.
Belizaire, 944 F. Supp. at 1212.
Id.
Id.
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questions about the limits that the Fourth Amendment places on officers’ use
of deadly force in specific situations such as when a person is fleeing or has a
knife. Analysis of the underlying facts of the case and the reasonableness of
the officer’s use of force in cases such as these are left by the wayside.
2. Qualified Immunity and Police Excessive Force at the Supreme Court
Post-Saucier (2001–2021)
After Saucier, the Court reviewed eleven more excessive force cases that
implicate qualified immunity. In all but two cases, the Court decided the
qualified immunity issue in favor of the police.378 Critically, many of the
Court’s decisions in this period were per curiam opinions that were decided
without full briefing on the issues or oral argument.379
This subsection briefly summarizes and discusses the impact of these
decisions. In recent years, the Court has used qualified immunity to further
degrade the Fourth Amendment by consistently overturning lower court
decisions that denied qualified immunity to police officers.380 We show how
the Court has continually raised the bar for what counts as clearly established
law, now requiring plaintiffs to point to prior excessive force cases that are
nearly identical to their own to move forward with their claims. Our
discussion also highlights how the Court decided to extend the decision to
apply qualified immunity to police officers in Saucier, where the force
involved was a “violent shove,” to increasingly brutal instances of police use
of force.
Three years after Saucier, the Supreme Court for the first time granted
qualified immunity to a police officer who decided to shoot and kill. In
Brosseau v. Haugen, police officer-defendant Brosseau shot Haugen in the back
as he was driving away from the scene of a fight he had been involved in.381
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Brosseau used excessive force and declined
to grant him qualified immunity on the grounds that shooting Haugen in the

See cases cited supra notes 79 & 336.
See generally Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam); Tolan v. Cotton, 572
U.S. 650 (2014) (per curiam); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015) (per curiam); White v. Pauly, 137
S. Ct. 548 (2017) (per curiam); Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam); Kisela v.
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (per curiam); City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500 (2019)
(per curiam); Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesuluna, 142 S. Ct. 4 (2021) (per curiam); City of Tahlequah v.
Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9 (2021) (per curiam).
380 See sources cited supra note 79; see also Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, supra note
30, at 82-83 (discussing how the Court nearly always reverses lower court decisions denying qualified
immunity and decides in favor of defendants).
381 543 U.S. 194, 195-97 (2004) (per curiam).
378
379
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back violated a clearly established right.382 The Supreme Court in a per curiam
opinion reversed the decision to deny qualified immunity to the officer.383
The Court framed the doctrine in slightly broader terms than ever before,
stating that qualified immunity shields officers who “reasonably
misapprehend” the law and emphasizing that qualified immunity turns on the
question of “fair notice.”384 The excessive force standards set out in Graham
and Garner were not, according to the Court, enough to provide officers with
fair warning about the law, as they “cast . . . a high level of generality.”385
Instead, there had to be a case where an officer faced the exact situation Officer
Brosseau confronted: “whether to shoot a disturbed felon, set on avoiding
capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area are at
risk from that flight.”386 Despite the fact that Haugen cited to a case where a
court found that an officer was not justified in using deadly force to stop a
fleeing suspect, the Court said that this was a “hazy” area of law, and because
the cases did not “clearly establish” a Fourth Amendment violation, Officer
Brosseau was entitled to qualified immunity.387
After Brossaeu, the Court went a decade without hearing another § 1983
excessive force case that raised the issue of qualified immunity. Then, the
Court took up Plumhoff v. Rickard.388 In this case, the police shot and killed a
driver and a passenger who had been pulled over for having a car headlight
that did not work.389 The Supreme Court held that the officers were entitled
to qualified immunity because on the exact date of the incident in 1999, there
was not yet a consensus on whether officers could shoot people in a fleeing
vehicle, even though subsequent case law might indicate that such use of force
is unlawful.390
In the third case involving a fleeing driver—Mullenix v. Luna—the driver
led officers on a high-speed chase after they tried to arrest him at a drive-in
restaurant.391 Several officers eventually set up spike strips, but one officer,
defendant Officer Mullenix, decided to shoot at the car instead, despite an
order from his superior to “stand by” and “see if the spikes work first.”392 The
Fifth Circuit denied qualified immunity to Mullenix, but yet again, the

382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392

Id. at 195.
Id. at 198.
Id.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201 (citing Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1993)).
572 U.S. 765 (2014).
Id. 768-70.
Id. at 779-81.
577 U.S. 7, 8 (2015) (per curiam).
Id. at 7, 8-10.
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Supreme Court overturned the appellate court.393 As before, the Court
described the requisite law that needed to be clearly established in remarkably
specific terms.394 Because there was no prior case law stating that police could
not shoot when specifically “confronted [with] a reportedly intoxicated
fugitive, set on avoiding capture through high-speed vehicular flight, who
twice during his flight had threatened to shoot police officers, and who was
moments away from encountering an officer [down the road],” there was no
clearly established standard for police to follow.395
Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissent in Mullenix criticizing both the Court’s
analysis of the facts and law, and aptly predicting the broader trajectory of
the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence.396 She correctly noted that
there had to be some governmental interest in order for excessive force to be
justified, and here, there was no plausible governmental interest in allowing
Mullenix to disregard orders and shoot rather than waiting for the spike strips
to work.397 Justice Sotomayor also cited Officer Mullenix’s disturbing
comments immediately after the incident to demonstrate how the Court’s
broadening of qualified immunity had perpetuated police violence.398 She
wrote:
When Mullenix confronted his superior officer after the shooting, his first
words were, “How’s that for proactive?” . . . . [T]he comment seems to me
revealing of the culture this Court’s decision supports when it calls it
reasonable—or even reasonably reasonable—to use deadly force for no
discernible gain and over a supervisor’s express order to “stand by.” By
sanctioning a “shoot first, think later” approach to policing, the Court renders
the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow.399

Justice Sotomayor would continue to raise these critical arguments as the Court
intervened in other cases to grant qualified immunity to police officers.400
In addition to the cases involving police officers shooting drivers, the
Court, in 2015, granted qualified immunity to police officers who shot a
woman with a mental disability after the officers forced their way into her
room in a group home.401 In City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, the
Id. at 19.
Id. at 11-13.
Id. at 13-15.
Id. at 20-26 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 21-23.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 25-26.
See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (“Such
a one-sided approach to qualified immunity transforms the doctrine into an absolute shield for law
enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment.”).
401 See City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 603-04, 617 (2015).
393
394
395
396
397
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399
400
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officers had been summoned to the group home by a worker who requested
help transporting Sheehan to a different facility after she had threatened the
worker.402 The woman had a knife and threatened to kill the officers as they
forced their way into her room, and the officers shot her several times.403 The
Court granted qualified immunity to the officers on the grounds that they
had “no fair and clear warning of what the Constitution requires” with respect
to the amount of force they could use under the circumstances.404
The cases from 2014 to 2015 marked the beginning of a trend where the
Court decided to review and overturn appellate court decisions denying
qualified immunity to police who used deadly force.405 From 2017 to 2021, the
Court issued six more opinions—this time all in the form of per curium
decisions—that overturned appellate court decisions that had previously
denied qualified immunity to police officers.406
First, in White v. Pauly, an officer arrived late to the scene of an ongoing
police action and shot and killed an armed occupant of the house without
giving any warning.407 The Court said that the case involved a “unique set of
facts and circumstances” because the officer arrived late, and therefore no
clearly established law proscribed the level of force he was allowed to use
under the circumstances.408
Second, in Kisela v. Hughes, an officer shot a woman wielding a kitchen
knife after responding to calls for a welfare check.409 The appellate court had
decided the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity because the law in
the circuit clearly established that it was unreasonable to use deadly force on
someone who had not committed a serious crime, was not evading arrest, and
was merely behaving strangely.410 The Supreme Court reversed on the basis
that this was “far from an obvious case in which any competent officer would
have known that shooting . . . would violate the Fourth Amendment.”411
Justice Sotomayor dissented from the decision, correctly noting that while
the victim in Kisela behaved erratically and had a kitchen knife, she did not

Id. at 603-04.
Id. at 604-06.
Id. at 617 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 768-70 (2014); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 9-11
(2015) (per curiam); City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 603-06, 617 (2015).
406 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005-08 (2017) (per curiam); White v. Pauly, 137 S.
Ct. 548, 549-53 (2017) (per curiam); Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1150-05 (2018) (per curiam); City
of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 501-04 (2019) (per curiam); Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesuluna, 142
S. Ct. 4 (2021) (per curiam); City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9 (2021) (per curiam).
407 137 S. Ct. 548, 549 (2017) (per curiam).
408 Id. at 552.
409 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1150 (2018) (per curiam).
410 Hughes v. Kisela, 862 F.3d 775, 785 (2016).
411 Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153.
402
403
404
405
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pose any immediate threat because she was not near anyone else, had not
committed a crime, and was not attempting to flee or evade arrest.412
Third, in City of Escondido v. Emmons, police officers responding to a domestic
disturbance took a man to the ground after he ignored the officers’ orders.413 The
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court decision on the grounds that the court
did not define clearly established law with adequate specificity.414
Fourth, in Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, an officer leaned on a man with his
knee after another officer had shot the man with a bean-bag gun.415 The
appellate court denied the officer qualified immunity, but the Supreme Court
reversed that decision on the grounds that the case the appellate court relied
on diverged from the facts of this situation.416
Fifth, in City of Tahlequah v. Bond, police officers responding to a domestic
disturbance shot and killed a man standing in a garage with a hammer as the
man “raised the hammer” as if he was about to throw it.417 The Tenth Circuit
held that the cases in the circuit established the officers could be held liable
under the Fourth Amendment, but the Supreme Court reversed on the
grounds that there was not a lower court case with facts that matched closely
enough to create clearly established law.418
Dissenting in Kisela, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsberg,
presented a powerful critique of the Court’s “disturbing trend” of overturning
lower court decisions and granting immunity to the officers.419 The dissent
called out the Court’s string of decisions that eviscerated Fourth Amendment
protections by “effectively treating qualified immunity as an absolute shield.”420
Justice Sotomayor highlighted how the Court had used its power to craft
policies reinventing the power balance between police and citizens, writing:
[T]his Court routinely displays an unflinching willingness “to summarily
reverse courts for wrongly denying officers the protection of qualified
immunity” but “rarely intervene[s] where courts wrongly afford officers the
benefit of qualified immunity in these same cases.” Such a one-sided approach
to qualified immunity transforms the doctrine into an absolute shield for law
enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment.

412
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Id. at 1156-57 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
139 S. Ct. 500, 501-02 (2019) (per curiam).
Id. at 503.
Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesuluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 6-7 (2021) (per curiam).
Id. at 7-8.
City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, at 10-11 (2021) (per curiam).
Id. at 11.
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The majority today exacerbates that troubling asymmetry. Its decision
is not just wrong on the law; it also sends an alarming signal to law
enforcement officers and the public. It tells officers that they can shoot first
and think later, and it tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will
go unpunished. Because there is nothing right or just under the law about
this, I respectfully dissent.421

As this overview of post-Saucier excessive force cases has shown, the Court
has ruled in favor of the police on the issue of qualified immunity in nearly
every case.422 The only exceptions were partial-wins for the plaintiffs in Tolan
v. Cotton and Hernandez v. Mesa.423 In Tolan, the Court concluded that the
Fifth Circuit failed to properly draw factual inferences in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff in its summary judgement decision on qualified
immunity.424 The ruling, however, was only a partial win for the plaintiff
because it only touched on the summary judgement standard and declined to
address whether the officer’s actions violated a clearly established right.425
Simimlarly in Hernandez, the Court concluded that the Fifth Circuit erred in
granting qualified immunity to a federal border patrol agent who had shot
and killed a fifteen-year-old Mexican child who was playing with his friends
on property that was on the U.S. side of the U.S.-Mexico border.426 The
ruling here was only a partial victory for the plaintiff, however, because it was
based on the appellate court’s failure to consider a critical fact in the case—
that the border patrol agent did not know the child’s nationality when he
decided to shoot him—rather than any principles about clearly established
Fourth Amendment standards, such as those that would prevent officers from
shooting unarmed children.427 As such, the Court merely remanded the case
and instructed the Fifth Circuit to redo the qualified immunity analysis
instead of affirmatively holding that an officer who shoots a child under such
circumstances has violated clearly established law and must face liability.428

Id. at 1162 (citations omitted).
See supra notes 79 & 336.
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657-60 (2014) (per curiam); Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct.
2003, 2007-08 (2017) (per curiam).
424 Tolan, 572 U.S. at 657.
425 Id. at 660.
426 Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2005.
427 See id. at 2007-08.
428 Id. Back at the Fifth Circuit on remand, the appellate court ultimately decided not to reach
the issue of qualified immunity because it decided that Bivens—which was the vehicle for the
excessive force claim here as the defendant was a federal border patrol rather than state officer—
does not provide a remedy for a foreign citizen shot by a U.S. officer in a cross-border shooting.
Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 741 (2020). The Supreme Court took the case up in 2020 and
affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision. Id.
421
422
423
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In the years after Saucier, the Court’s relationship to qualified immunity
and excessive force changed substantially. Before Saucier, the two doctrines
were mostly unrelated. Questions of excessive force were largely decided
under constitutional principles, as foundational cases on excessive force like
Garner and Graham made clear. And qualified immunity, when it came to the
Court, involved cases with a variety of underlying facts and claims. But after
Saucier, excessive force was forever entwined with qualified immunity and the
question of “clearly established law.” This has underdeveloped federal courts’
assessments of which particular uses of force violate the Constitution, giving
more leeway to police to use force and reducing the likelihood of
accountability when force becomes excessive.
Our empirical findings429 demonstrate that after Saucier, qualified
immunity almost exclusively came to the Supreme Court through excessive
force cases. And as our discussion of the recent excessive force cases at the
Supreme Court shows, in the aftermath of Saucier, the Court took on what
was effectively a policy campaign of telling lower courts that they should use
qualified immunity to shield police from civil lawsuits when they use
excessive force. The Court’s decision to rule in favor of police—nearly all of
whom used deadly force—in nine out of the eleven post-Saucier decisions
corroborates Justice Sotomayor’s warning that the Court’s qualified immunity
doctrine teaches police to “shoot first and think later” and tells the public that
“palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished.”430
CONCLUSION: RECLAIMING § 1983
Now that we have set forth both the history and the consequences of the
decision to formally introduce qualified immunity in excessive force law, we
can better understand the urgency of recent demands to abolish the doctrine.
As we explained at the beginning of this Article, § 1983 was created during
Reconstruction following the Civil War as a response to widespread abuse of
power and racialized violence by public officers.431 Today, qualified immunity
takes that power out of § 1983. The Court can reclaim the original intent of §
1983 by overturning the holding in Saucier v. Katz that definitively brought
qualified immunity to Fourth Amendment excessive force cases. Before
Saucier, many circuits said that the qualified immunity inquiry in excessive
force cases was inappropriate and duplicative to the extent that it matched

429
430
431

See supra Part V.
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1155, 1162.
See supra Section I.A.
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the reasonableness prong of the Fourth Amendment analysis regarding
whether the use of force was lawful. The Court needs to return to the preSaucier era where the determination of whether a police officer violated the
Fourth Amendment rested largely on an examination of whether their actions
aligned with constitutional principles. There may be reason to be hopeful that
the Court might rethink qualified immunity, as Justices Sotomayor and
Thomas have both recently voiced concerns about the doctrine in written
opinions.432 In the Supreme Court’s 2020-2021 term, nine qualified immunity
cases were considered for review, including several that asked the court
explicitly to reconsider the doctrine.433 The Court ultimately declined to hear
any of these cases.434
On the legislative side, there have been both federal and state bills aimed
at ending qualified immunity. Colorado’s governor signed a bill in June 2020
that, among other reforms, eliminated qualified immunity for police officers
facing liability under Colorado state law.435 The law, however, did not change
the rules governing qualified immunity for officers sued under the federal §
1983 statute.436 Also in June 2020, U.S. House Representatives Justin Amash
and Ayanna Pressley introduced the “Ending Qualified Immunity Act,”
which would eliminate qualified immunity in any federal civil lawsuit that
alleges a deprivation of rights.437 United States Senator Edward Markey
introduced an identical “Ending Qualified Immunity Act” bill in the Senate
in July, which was co-sponsored by Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders.438
432 In June 2020, Justice Thomas wrote that “qualified immunity doctrine appears to stray from
the statutory text . . . .” in a dissent from a decision to deny certiorari. Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct.
1862, 1862 (June 15, 2020). Concurring in Ziglar v. Abbasi, Justice Thomas wrote that “[i]n further
elaborating the doctrine of qualified immunity . . . we have diverged from the historical inquiry
mandated by the statute.” 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017). Justice Sotomayor wrote in Kisela v. Hughes that
qualified immunity has become “an absolute shield for law enforcement officers” that has “gutt[ed]
the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment.” 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).
433 See cases cited supra note 29; John Elwood, Relist Watch: Looking for the Living Among the
Dead, SCOTUSBLOG (May 27, 2020, 11:29 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/05/relist-watchlooking-for-the-living-among-the-dead [https://perma.cc/RNC8-NQGN] (listing the nine cases
that “in one way or another all challenge current qualified immunity”).
434 See cases cited supra note 29.
435 See, S.B. 20-217, 72nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020), https://leg.colorado.gov/
sites/default/files/2020a_217_signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/46P7-UH37]; see also Keith Coffman, Colorado
Reform Law Ends Immunity for Police in Civil Misconduct Cases, REUTERS (June 2020, 12:20 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-minneapolis-police-colorado/colorado-reform-law-ends-immunity-forpolice-in-civil-misconduct-cases-idUSKBN23R05Xf [https://perma.cc/EN32-HDWR].
436 Jay Schweikert, Colorado Passes Historic, Bipartisan Policing Reforms to Eliminate Qualified
Immunity, CATO INST. (June 22, 2020, 11:31 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/colorado-passes-historicbipartisan-policing-reforms-eliminate-qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/4NKK-6ARV].
437 Ending Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2020). As of December 3, 2020,
the bill was most recently referred to the house judiciary committee in June 2020.
438 Ending Qualified Immunity Act, S. 4142 116th Cong. (2020). As of December 3, 2020, the
bill was most recently referred to the senate committee on the judiciary in July 2020.
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As one might expect, law enforcement groups lobbied against the legislative
efforts to end the immunity and received some support from legislators.439
U.S. House Representative Jim Banks, for example, introduced a bill to
codify qualified immunity, which would elevate the doctrine from a judicially
created rule to a federal law, thereby protecting it from court action.440
While eliminating qualified immunity would be a step in the right
direction toward combating excessive force by police, it is also important to
recognize the limits of qualified immunity reforms. First, qualified
immunity only deals with civil liability and money damages. It would not
address how the criminal justice system has consistently failed to pursue
criminal prosecution of police officers when they commit unlawful acts of
violence with criminal impulse. In addition, even without qualified
immunity, the constitutional standard governing Fourth Amendment
excessive force law would still be a barrier to police liability. As we discussed
earlier when analyzing the “double reasonableness” problem, excessive force
doctrine operates under the ambiguous objective reasonableness test
established in Graham v. Connor.441 This reasonableness standard hinders the
development of specific on-the-ground guidelines for police use of force by
preventing courts from creating concrete rules that might protect citizens.
The resulting ambiguity allows police departments to signal compliance with
constitutional standards by adopting vague policies that only require police
to act “reasonably.”442
It is also worth questioning whether reforms regarding civil liability would
actually spur substantial changes to policing practices. For one thing, police
departments, municipalities, and their insurers—not individual officers—nearly
always pay for any damages won by plaintiffs.443 This mitigates the financial
risks of civil liability that ought to deter police from using excessive force.444
439 See Kimberly Kindy, Dozens of States Have Tried to End Qualified Immunity. Police Officers and Unions
Helped Beat Nearly Every Bill, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/qualified-immunity-police-lobbying-state-legislatures/2021/10/06/60e546bc-0cdf-11ec-aea142a8138f132a_story.html [https://perma.cc/E5D8-WQUB].
440 Qualified Immunity Act of 2020, H.R. 7951, 116th Cong. (2020).
441 See 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); John P. Gross, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: The Excessive Use
of Deadly Force by Police Officers, 21 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 155, 161 (2016) (explaining that Supreme
Court case law has resulted in “a highly deferential standard by which to determine whether use of
force is justified; the decision to use deadly force is left almost entirely up to the individual officer”).
442 See Obasogie & Newman, The Endogenous Fourth Amendment, supra note 259, at 1288
(“Instead of an independent judiciary determining the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and
impressing it upon local police departments, local departments create meaning and symbolic
adherence to ambiguous constitutional norms by developing use-of-force policies that reflect their
own institutional and administrative preferences. In turn, federal courts defer to these policies as a
reasonable iteration of police force.”).
443 See generally Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 30.
444 Id.
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Indeed, some commentators have suggested that requiring police departments
to carry liability insurance would reduce police violence because “high-risk”
officers could be charged higher premiums or insurance companies could
simply refuse to cover officers with records of abuse.445 But expanding this
insurance market would mean that police departments would have the added
benefit of insurance company resources when fighting excessive force lawsuits.
And moreover, the insurance company solution is only possible if we assume
and accept that the future inevitably involves a continuation or expansion of
law enforcement’s current role in society.
Structural accounts of police violence recognize that police violence is
routine, rather than aberrational, and lies at the core of police behavior.
Critiques of reform-based approaches offer good reason to be skeptical of the
potential for any single policy change to combat excessive force by police. But
the fact that the existing constitutional rules on excessive force have such little
power to begin with makes the need to eliminate the additional barrier of
qualified immunity more, not less, urgent. It is critical to recognize the
invention of qualified immunity and the contested decision to carry it into
excessive force law as political decisions that further deteriorated what was an
already rotting Fourth Amendment.

445 Clark Neily, Make Cops Carry Liability Insurance: The Private Sector Knows How to Spread
Risks, and Costs, CATO INST. (March 29, 2018), https://www.cato.org/commentary/make-cops-carryliability-insurance-private-sector-knows-how-spread-risks-costs [https://perma.cc/3YJR-U5GJ].
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